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Iran: Nuclear Weapons
Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what decisions were taken at the meeting of E3+3 Political Directors in Paris on 1 December about the next stage in discussions with Iran over its nuclear programme; and when the next meeting between Javier Solana and Saeed Jalili is expected. [172792]
David Miliband: E3+3 Political Directors agreed in Paris on 1 December that neither the report of Mohammed El Baradei nor that of Javier Solana could be described as a ‘positive outcome’, the test set in the statement issued by E3+3 Foreign Ministers on 28 September in New York. Accordingly, they agreed that we should seek a new UN Security Council sanctions resolution. Dr. Solana made clear to Sa’id Jalili that they should remain in touch as necessary, but there is no date fixed for a further meeting at present.
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Mr. Hague: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of whether Iran is meeting its commitments under the IAEA-Iran work plan of August 2007; and if he will make a statement. [172793]
David Miliband: Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reported on 15 November the level of co-operation Iran was giving the agency following the agreement of the IAEA-Iran work plan. In his report, he stated that Iran had provided ‘sufficient access’ to individuals and had responded in a ‘timely manner’ to the IAEA’s questions. However, he also noted that co-operation had been ‘reactive rather than proactive’ and that active co-operation and full transparency were ‘indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the work plan’. Even more concerning, he noted that the IAEA’s knowledge about Iran’s current nuclear programme is diminishing.
We share Dr. El Baradei’s concerns. After many years of concealing its nuclear programme, Iran has still not disclosed in full its past nuclear activities, and the IAEA is still unable to state its confidence in the answers Iran has given. To do this, the IAEA has made clear that Iran needs to give proactive co-operation and implement the Additional Protocol. Unless Iran does this, the IAEA has said it is unable to provide assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of the programme. If Iran is serious about building international trust, it should implement the Additional Protocol and suspend all enrichment-related activities without delay.
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Mr. Dai Davies: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the most recent United States intelligence agencies’ National Intelligence Estimate Report, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. [173081]
Dr. Howells: It is not the practice of this or previous Governments to comment on intelligence matters. However, nothing in the National Intelligence Estimate changes the fundamental problem that we face which is Iran’s pursuit of a uranium enrichment programme that has, as far as we can see, no civilian application. This is despite the unanimous demand from the UN Security Council and from the International Atomic Energy Agency that it stops doing so. Accordingly, we will continue to act in the UN, the EU and bilaterally to persuade Iran to change its approach and comply with its international responsibilities.