2013 This report examines the “damage criteria” used by the MOD in planning the UK’s nuclear weapons programme and more recent replacements, and how a desire for particular weapons systems has reshaped the amount of damage considered acceptable. By John Ainslie Download if the embedded viewer has a problem
Tag: The Nuclear Deterrent
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Unacceptable Damage
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UK Government, ‘The Future of the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent.’
December 2006.
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Bradford University, Tim Hare, ‘A Part-Time Deterrent?’
17 September 2009.
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House of Lords UK, ‘Nuclear Deterrent’
18 May 2011.
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UK Parliament, ‘Nuclear Deterrent.’
18 May 2011.
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Ministry of Defence, Sir Clive Rose, ‘Nuclear Matters.’
30 November 1978.
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‘Top Secret, UK Eyes A, Factors Relating to Further Consideration of The Future of The United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent: Part I: The Politico-Military Requirement.’
No date.
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‘Top Secret, Terms of Reference for a Study of Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent.’
1978.
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John Ainslie Notes, ‘Mottram’s comments, Duff report.’
No date.
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Top Secret, UK Eyes A: ‘The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent, A Commentary.’
No date.
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John Ainslie research archive notes, ‘John’s and Kristian’s Duff-Mason list.’
No date.
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UK Government, ‘Damage Capability of the POLARIS Force.’
No date.
