The note advises on the line the Secretary of State for Defence might take at the meeting on 4 April 1984 to discuss the JIC report. It says that “Heightened Soviet concern about the possibility of a surprise NATO attack would of course be a very proper cause of concern for Western governments. But it is I think necessary to consider the strength of evidence and the implications of possible NATO reactions carefully. The report brought together evidence which was not necessarily related, and represents a compromise”. But “These reservations notwithstanding, we clearly need to guard against any possibility of Soviet misinterpretation, however slight the evidence. I would therefore wholly endorse the final sentence of the conclusions of the paper which proposes further “close examination of the degree and scope of Warsaw Pact reactions to NATO nuclear exercises”. The Prime Minister however wish to consider whether any further steps need to be taken to allay possible Soviet concerns”.
The report points out that military exercise activity is “crucial not only to the effectiveness of our political and military command structures, but also to the credibility of deterrence”. One possibility “which might go some way to allaying possible Soviet concern, and which is compatible both with deterrence and with the Western position on confidence building measures” is that “NATO should inform the Soviet Union on a routine basis of proposed NATO exercise activity involving nuclear play”.
Among the lines to take which the Secretary of State might wish to consider in discussion are the points that exercise activity is a vital element of deterrence, but “nonetheless we must view with unease and evidence, [redacted], of heightened Soviet concern”, and that there may be considerable merit in discussing “the possibility that NATO should inform the Soviet Union on a routine basis of proposed NATO exercise activity involving nuclear play, as a useful confidence building measure.”