

A RESILIENT NATION

NATIONAL SECURITY

GREEN PAPER

Policy Green Paper No.13



Contents

Executive Summary	3
1. Britain's Place in the World	5
1.1 A global trading nation.....	5
1.2 Global threats	5
2. A Unified Security Approach.....	7
2.1 The National Security Council.....	8
2.2 The National Security Strategy	11
2.3 The Strategic Defence and Security Review	11
3. Some Fundamental Continuities	12
3.1 NATO	12
3.2 Maintaining the nuclear deterrent	13
3.3 EU cooperation.....	13
3.4 Active involvement in international institutions	13
3.5 Countering weapons proliferation	14
3.6 Maintaining security of the 2012 Olympic Games	16
4. Changes Needed	17
4.1 A liberal Conservative foreign policy	17
4.2 Building a capacity for preventative action	17
4.3 A more integrated approach to post-conflict reconstruction.....	19
4.4 A new emphasis on domestic security	19
4.5 A new focus on our capacity to deal with emergencies, including through the establishment of a new Permanent Military Command for Homeland Defence and Security	20
4.6 Increased attention to the resilience of critical infrastructure	21
4.7 Striking the right balance – ensuring security while civil liberties and social Ccohesion	23
Annex 1: Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan	26
Annex 2: Energy Security	27
Annex 3: Structure of the National Resilience Team	28
5. Footnotes	29

Executive Summary

Britain's place in the world

Global changes are affecting not only Britain's commercial interests but also our domestic security.

- Britain is an international 'hub', which depends on trade and has close links to many parts of the globe; our security and our ability to influence world events depend upon our reputation as an open, democratic society, our membership of international institutions and on continued international stability.
- Threats to international stability (and hence to our domestic security) come from: population increase; climate change; globalisation; conflict, terrorism and organised criminal activity affecting national security, as well as the proliferation of potentially hostile technologies.

In short, we no longer inhabit a 'simple' world in which foreign and defence issues can be separated from domestically generated threats. Instead, we live in a world in which dangers, events and actions abroad are inter-dependent with threats to our security at home.

A unified security approach

To deal with this new world, we need to see national security 'in the round'. This means linking all the relevant parts of government in a new institutional structure that enables all the relevant expertise and power to be brought to bear in a coordinated way. We will therefore:

- establish a new National Security Council;
- draw up a new National Security Strategy; and
- conduct a new Strategic Defence and Security Review.

The National Security Council will:

- replace the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development and the Ministerial Civil Contingencies Committee;
- include representatives of relevant departments;
- be responsible for all national security policy decisions;
- have a range of sub-committees reporting to it;
- be supported by its own Cabinet Office secretariat, reporting to a National Security Adviser, and by a new National Resilience Team, reporting into the Cabinet Office;
- be supported by a strengthened central intelligence machinery; and
- have the capacity to create cross-departmental budgets to underpin the delivery of national security policies.

The first task of the National Security Council will be to oversee the drawing up of the new National Security Strategy.

The second task of the National Security Council will be to oversee a Strategic Defence and Security Review that implements the new strategy.

Some fundamental continuities

The new National Security Strategy, and the accompanying Strategic Defence and Security Review will be built on certain solid foundations – features that have been at the heart of bi-partisan policy over many years, including:

- NATO, EU cooperation and active involvement in international institutions
- the nuclear deterrent; and
- continued determination to prevent proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Changes needed

The new, integrated approach to national security will mean some major changes in the way we do business. In particular, it will involve:

- a liberal Conservative attitude to foreign policy which champions an enlightened vision of the national interest;
- reducing the need for military intervention by building a capacity for preventative action, including a greater role for diplomacy led by the FCO and for contributions from a wider range of government departments;
- a more integrated approach to post-conflict reconstruction – with a new Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force;
- a new focus on key parts of domestic security which have been ignored to date, such as border security;
- a more structured military contribution to homeland security;
- much greater emphasis on the resilience of the country's critical infrastructure; and
- a new concern with ensuring that security legislation does not compromise civil liberties, and with strengthening social cohesion.

1. Britain's Place in the World

1.1 A global trading nation

Global changes are bound to affect not only Britain's commercial interests but also our domestic security. Britain is an international 'hub'. We depend on trade. We have close links with many parts of the globe. Our security and our ability to influence world events depend on our reputation as a bastion of liberal democratic values, on our membership of international institutions and on continued international stability.

- *Dependence on trade, capital and resource flows.* We rely on exports for 25 per cent of our GDP. Direct investment abroad by UK companies totalled £137.7 billion in 2007, with the value of these investments standing at £918.9 billion.¹ Our patterns of trade and investment are global – they are not confined to particular localities or regions.² Our imports and exports are predicated on free trade, which in turn relies on international political stability. Until recently a net oil and gas producer, we have come to rely heavily on the import of hydrocarbons largely from unstable parts of the world.
- *Britain as an 'international hub'.* Britain is an international financial, media, education, tourism and communications centre. London, along with New York and Tokyo, has had a place as one of three 'command centres' for the global economy which it will be important to continue to sustain.³ Between 30 and 40 million tourists visit the UK each year spending approximately £3 to £4 billion. Not as numerous as the US (over 50 million visitors) and France (80 million visitors) but significant and comparable to Italy. There are over 200,000 foreign students in the UK's higher education institutes and, of the G8 countries, Britain has the highest proportion of foreigners in its student population.
- *Links to most parts of the world through history and heritage.* People across the world are tied to the United Kingdom by language, culture and blood. And the UK has links to most parts of the world through history and heritage. This is reflected in the Commonwealth, which has members in all the inhabited continents. The UK is a nexus between diaspora communities. UK citizens are found around the world. Approximately one in five British citizens lives abroad. In 2008, the latest year for which figures are available, 590,000 foreign citizens immigrated to the UK and 427,000 UK citizens emigrated. The United Kingdom is also responsible for fourteen overseas territories and Crown Dependencies, including locations of strategic importance for this country's defence and intelligence capability such as Cyprus and others, such as South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the British Antarctic Territory, which are important natural resource areas.
- *Liberal democratic values.* Britain has been at the forefront of advancing the domestic and international human rights agenda – whether ending the slave trade, advancing women's rights, providing development and humanitarian assistance, or upholding Geneva conventions and the rule-based international system. UK adherence to these values at home and abroad will continue to be an important aspect of this country's international influence.
- *Long-standing relationships, Alliances, partnerships and membership of core international institutions.* Britain has a long-standing, deep and trusting relationship with the United States, politically, militarily, in security, and in the private sector. The UK is also member of important international Alliances and institutions. These are familiar: permanent membership of the Security Council; of the Commonwealth with The Queen at its head; of the European Union, of NATO, the G8 and G20. All suffer from well advertised defects but together they nevertheless provide the framework for the UK's security and defence as well as for our wider claim to a leading international role and they are the organisations within which objectives important to UK interests are likely to be determined.

1.2 Global threats

What therefore are the UK's national interests?

- maintaining the UK's territorial integrity and interests, and ensuring the safety of British citizens;
- the security of international trade, investment and resource flows;
- a stable, just and rules-based international system and, within it, the continued primacy of the ordered nation state; and

-
- effective Alliances and institutions of international governance.

Threats to these interests come from many quarters:

- *Population increase.* The growth in world population from 6 billion in 1999 to a projected 9 billion by 2043 will be the biggest medium term driver of change. It will increase pressure on land use and all commodities, and catalyse, interact with and intensify the effects of other agents of change.
- *Climate change.* Long term changes to geographical conditions are already taking place. Extreme weather events, such as flooding and drought, have become more frequent and destructive. In the UK it is already clear that the frequency of civil emergencies is rising and is a hazard against which much greater protection than has hitherto been planned for is needed. The most recent climate change predictions indicate not only that severe weather events will increase in the future, but that the public (and our infrastructure) will have to adapt to warmer temperatures on land and sea and to rising sea levels.⁴ Globally, climate change may prove to be a threat to the very existence of nations. It also acts as a risk multiplier, reinforcing tension and propensity to conflict – for example, over depleting water supplies and other resources – and also accelerating hazards, as extreme weather incidents and permanent change to geographical conditions increase. Climate change interacts especially viciously with standards of living in already poor or weakened societies, deepening distress and bringing the danger of widespread unrest. After a natural catastrophe poor communities obviously find it especially hard to recover. The risk is real of an increase in failed or near failing states which can become havens for terrorists and other criminals or increase regional instability, which in turn can threaten UK interests. Over time, climate change has the potential to alter balances of power with security implications. One example is the possible effects of rising temperatures in the Arctic. These will allow access to potential oil reserves and mineral deposits, for which the search is already on. Rising temperatures will also make the polar routes and North East passage more accessible to shipping, thereby shortening transit times between East and West with economic implications for countries like Egypt dependent for a significant share of her foreign exchange on the existing route through the Suez Canal.
- *Side-effects of globalisation.* The most significant secular political change of the last twenty years, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been globalisation – started by Western financial institutions operating on a 24/7 basis worldwide through modern technology. Open global markets and free trade have brought into being new, highly dynamic and increasingly indigenous centres of wealth creation, especially but not exclusively, in Asia. It is China which is leading the way out of recession. This spreading prosperity, hugely positive in itself, will have major long term effects. We need to look especially carefully at those factors which may be capable of causing either structural alterations in the international system or of so impacting on the standing and welfare of the UK as to threaten our geopolitical positioning within it. Globalisation has already brought consequences:
 - the increase in global wealth has also diffused political power well beyond the West. As the emergence of the G20 recognises, there are now larger numbers at the international table;
 - economic growth of the rising powers puts pressure on natural resource supplies, including food. Even if, in the short term, the economic recession slows demand and competition for some resources, assured supply of basic commodities is becoming a security issue;
 - global wealth creation has widened the gap between rich and poor. While globalisation has spread the capacity of more countries and regions to become indigenous centres of wealth creation, it has not done so evenly. Inequalities of wealth on a global basis have increased as some formerly poor soar away from those left behind; and
 - poor governance is both a product and a driver of poverty, disease and other ills in society. Absence of functioning institutions and prevalence of corruption trap societies into a downward spiral of decline which is hard to reverse: they are vulnerable to infestation by terrorists and organised criminals, thus becoming blackspots liable for international punitive action.
- *Conflict, terrorism and instability.* A wide range of non-state actors now challenge constituted authority, either by evading it or confronting it, or both. They represent serious threats to ordered society and the rule of law, internationally and domestically, and they undermine the values that Western democracies seek to promote:
 - the roots of terrorism are many and some lie in longstanding local grievances. Terrorists have, however, been given renewed force and appeal, especially in the Muslim world, by challenging corruption, the illegitimacy of states in which elites fail to democratise wealth and power, and by attacking their enemies' friends and allies. Network

terrorists operate on a transnational basis, greatly aided by Western technology. They exploit ‘unregulated spaces’ – or even capture failed states – to train and command while operating underground in societies they wish to destroy. The current epicentre of global terrorism along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border represents a direct and serious threat to the UK in particular. But there is no reason to suppose that the highly mobile terrorist of no fixed address will not set up elsewhere – as for instance is already happening in the coastal states of the Middle East and Africa along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Some powers, like Iran, choose to play both sides of the fence, sponsoring terrorist movements to achieve state objectives. The Middle East, the Gulf (including, particularly, Yemen), North and East Africa, the Horn of Africa (for example, Somalia), and North West Asia will remain zones of high tension and instability prone to conflict and generators of terrorism. Weak states in these areas can be further weakened by organised criminal networks operating across continents in a global black economy.

- *Proliferation of potentially hostile technologies.* Technology has driven globalisation. But it can also be put to malign uses:
 - the greatest danger is the illegal nuclear arms trade in which state and non state actors engage. Iran’s apparent determination to acquire a viable nuclear weapons capability if not – more likely – nuclear weapons themselves, offers an immediate threat to the peace and stability of the whole Middle East and especially the Gulf. North Korea’s destabilising activities as a nuclear proliferator increase tension well beyond North East Asia. Failure to bring an effective control regime into being will surely result in a big expansion of the numbers of overt and covert nuclear states with potentially calamitous long term effects on international stability as well as on existing balances of power. There is also growing awareness of the danger of terrorists making or acquiring ‘dirty’ bombs;
 - the likelihood of biological and chemical weapons proliferation is also increasing. Indeed, the US National Intelligence Council has judged that terrorist attacks using these weapons are more likely than the use of a nuclear device. Individuals are able to create and wield biological and chemical weapons without the support or technological infrastructure of a state. And knowledge of how to make such weapons is quite widespread and the materials relatively cheap
 - the other side of the technology coin is the reliance of developed societies and economies on networks and computer systems for the effective functioning of all aspects of daily life which creates new vulnerabilities for exploitation by malicious actors. Despite frequent occurrences round the world of service denial and disruption of inadequately protected electronic systems, the threat of cyber attack is widely disregarded. The West, which has become so dependent on technology, will also find that its current technological superiority will decline over the long-term.

2. A Unified Security Approach

As other major and emerging powers explore alternative modes of engagement that bypass traditional Western dominance, classic conventional war seems a low probability. But conflict of a complicated type is already making considerable demands on our Armed Forces and is likely to continue to do so in the future. ‘Hybrid conflict’ involves different actors and modes of engagement – conventional combat; terrorism; insurgency; cyber engagement and disruptions to (often extended) supply lines – simultaneously across a range of areas. Furthermore, the distinction between state and non-state actors is being blurred. In addition to military assets, the techniques that need to be brought to bear to gain advantage are likely to include a quite wide ranging number of civilian policy instruments.

The complexity of the responses required illustrate the need to see national security ‘in the round’. This means linking all the relevant parts of government in a new institutional structure that enables all the relevant expertise and power to be brought to bear in a coordinated way. We will therefore:

- establish a new National Security Council;
- draw up a new National Security Strategy; and
- conduct a new Strategic Defence and Security Review.

2.1 The National Security Council

The National Security Council will:

- *replace the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID) and the Ministerial Civil Contingencies Committee.* The NSC will ensure that departments across Whitehall are able to bring their expertise together at the centre not just to coordinate or to comment on the efforts of others but to think strategically about policy, relate its different aspects to each other in a coherent whole, and innovate in departmental delivery. We will encourage fresh intellectual input from outside government though this does not replace the need to restore to the civil service its proper function of giving well conceived and informed advice to Ministers;
- *include representatives of all relevant departments.* The NSC will be chaired by the Prime Minister with Ministerial membership drawn from all Whitehall departments with security responsibilities central to their function. The core membership will be the Foreign Secretary (who will be deputy chair in the Prime Minister's absence), the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the International Development Secretary, the Security Minister and other Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister. Other colleagues will be present when their responsibilities are involved (for example, energy security) and engaged through the sub-committee structure. The NSC will be advised by, among others, the Chief of the Defence Staff (with single service Chiefs as necessary), the Heads of the security and intelligence agencies and a National Security Adviser at official level who will head the supporting National Security Secretariat. The NSC will be responsible as a de facto 'War Cabinet' for the conduct of the UK contribution to the mission in Afghanistan. If elected, we will invite the leaders of the main opposition parties to attend the war cabinet on a regular basis so they can offer their advice and insights;
- *be responsible for all national security policy decisions.* The NSC will:
 - agree a comprehensive, long-term 'all hazard' National Security Strategy incorporating relevant sub-strategies (for example, counter terrorism, critical infrastructure, cyber security, overseas/conflict prevention) and determining related resource allocation;
 - supervise the attainment of strategic goals identified by the National Security Strategy;
 - foster a culture of integrated policy-making on the national security agenda between colleagues and their Departments;
 - manage crises affecting national security; and
 - have the capacity to decide on the creation of cross-departmental budgets for the delivery of national security policies.
- *have a range of sub-committees reporting to it.* As part of the Cabinet Committee system, the NSC will have reporting to it a number of sub committees where much of the more detailed business would be conducted under the chairmanship of the appropriate departmental Minister (Figure 1). These will include sub-committees, inter alia on terrorism, protective security and resilience, defence and overseas, and intelligence. Also, temporary committees will be needed for specific issues for as long as it takes to resolve them. For example:
 - Strategic Defence and Security Review;
 - Olympic Safety and Security; and
 - emergency services matters.
- *involve Permanent Secretaries.* Permanent Secretaries will be brought into the operations of the NSC at 'deputies' level, to ensure that departments required to implement have full sight of and participation in strategic thinking at its formative stage. The National Security Adviser will chair them and be the link with the NSC at Ministerial level.
- *be supported by a new National Resilience Team reporting into the Cabinet Office.* This will:
 - adopt an 'all hazards' approach to critical infrastructure and emergency response which will bring together the implementation functions of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat; elements of CESG; the Information Security and Assurance Unit in the Cabinet Office; the work of the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and National

Counter Terrorism Security Office; and the Office for Cyber Security by forming a new National Resilience Team. This Team, a counterpart to OSCT, will be comprised of three units: for Critical Infrastructure and Crowded Places; for Emergency Preparedness; and for Cyber Security and Information Assurance (see Annex 3).

- *be supported by a strengthened intelligence machinery* through:
 - separation of accountability between intelligence assessment on the one hand, and national security policy/policy-making on the other. The structures surrounding the NSC must simultaneously ensure the availability of advice from the intelligence community and the community's proper independence;
 - stronger strategic direction from a senior post in the Cabinet Office of the intelligence community as a whole, including: tasking, resource allocation and shared support services, support for the development of a professional career stream for analysts and strategic engagement with foreign partners;
 - ensuring that intelligence assessments better represent viable alternative or differing interpretations and hypotheses;
 - greater Parliamentary oversight from a strengthened Intelligence and Security Committee with special rules appropriate to its function, with a better known public face, able to call for papers, conduct its own investigations and issue its own reports. The rules of procedure will need to be appropriate to the material it deals with, which must preserve operational secrecy and the requirements of national security; and
 - consistent with national security, release of more information to the public including financial information.
- *have its own Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, reporting to a National Security Adviser.* The Council will be directly supported by a Secretariat composed of two Directorates covering External Affairs and Security and Resilience, responsible for supporting Ministers in:
 - drawing up the National Security Strategy for Ministerial approval;
 - monitoring NSS implementation;
 - overseeing the development of sub-strategies compatible with the NSS (e.g. CONTEST, Olympic Safety and Security Strategy, Resilience Strategy and long-term plans for CNI) and monitoring their implementation;
 - providing briefing and secretarial support to the NSC and its sub-committees;
 - ensuring functioning central government crisis arrangements; and
 - meeting requirements of Parliamentary accountability.

The Directorates will be formed by rationalising and integrating the overlapping functions of the existing security-related secretariats in the Cabinet Office – the National Security Secretariat, the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and parts of the European and Global Issues Secretariat. In all cases, where implementation responsibilities exist, these will return to departments with the exception of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat where the heavy implementation load, closely linked to counter terrorism 'Protect' and 'Prepare' work, would best be dealt with by the creation of a new organisation covering both – a new National Resilience Team. This is discussed in detail in Annex 3.

This Directorate structure will be responsive to changing circumstances and special needs. Just as temporary Ministerial Sub-committees of the NSC will be formed as necessary, the Secretariat should also be flexible in forming Action Groups around particular issues such as Afghanistan/Pakistan, provided this does not lead to proliferation of redundant small groups.

The NSC will need strong analytical support at the centre for its strategic work. The threat driven work of the Assessments Staff and Joint Intelligence Committee will remain important but a wider view of risk is also needed. It would make sense to bring together the output of the horizon scanning activity that takes place across government at the centre alongside the JIC/Assessment Staff work. Systematic examination of potential threats, hazards and opportunities is important to serious risk management and to awareness of issues with longer term, complicated international antecedents (like energy security) or complex impact (like climate change). Issues and ideas at the margins of conventional thinking and planning are complementary to classic Joint Intelligence Committee work and co-locating the two will strengthen the intellectual challenge

process vital to both. In addition to this, at all levels of intelligence analysis the interconnections and interdependencies between different risks must be better assessed.

The NSC and the National Security Secretariat will also need a clear relationship with line Departments. In some Departments, such as the FCO, joint and integrated Strategy Units have been created. These Units are examples of good practice and will have a key role not only in delivering the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy, but in informing the development of that Strategy and in developing sub-strategies. The point is to harness their efforts. The work of these Units should therefore feed into the relevant Directorates of the National Security Secretariat, and the Secretariat should in turn monitor Departmental delivery of strategic objectives by interfacing with these Strategy Units.

FIG. 1: MINISTERIAL NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (AND SUB-COMMITTEES)





FIG. 2: NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETARIAT



2.2 The National Security Strategy

A Conservative government will task the National Security Council with responsibility for drawing up the National Security Strategy, updating it once a Parliament and monitoring its implementation. The purpose of the National Security Strategy is to set the framework across government for all security-related work over the longer-term (up to approximately 2025) including for the Strategic Defence and Security Review by:

- defining and prioritising the UK’s national security goals and interests and the key risks to them;
- clarifying the strategic connections between different risks;
- focusing Departmental attention on these strategic connections and clearly identifying where cross-Departmental working is required;
- developing a cross-Government planning process that can be applied to each interest/risk and which brings together different national instruments;
- informing the development of sub-strategies within it; and
- providing indicative metrics to assess outcomes and impacts.

To fulfil this role, the NSC machinery will need to undertake systematic long-term risk assessment including the mapping of the United Kingdom’s national interests against the risks we face, and develop risk mitigation strategies and planning assumptions flowing from this assessment. To ensure accountability the NSC will publish an annual status report which assesses progress against the strategic objectives outlined in the NSS and sub-strategies, and a Parliamentary Joint Committee on National Security will also be asked to scrutinise the Strategy and its delivery.

2.3 The Strategic Defence and Security Review

The second task of the National Security Council will be to oversee a Strategic Defence and Security Review that implements the new strategy.

Twenty years ago the Berlin Wall fell, the Cold War ended and the last Soviet tank retreated from Afghanistan. Few defence experts predicted in 1989 that a thousand weeks later British troops would be fighting in Afghanistan, or that by 2001 terrorists trained in the ungoverned areas of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border would have turned airliners into guided missiles or that by 2005 young men born in Britain and trained in Pakistan would have killed themselves and many others on the London Underground.

The last Defence Review took place eleven years ago. Since then, we have had the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, our country has embarked on two major wars, and the international economic and political landscape has shifted fundamentally. Yet we still have an approach to our defence and security designed in the optimism of the aftermath of the Cold War.

We can’t go on like this.

The Strategic Defence and Security Review will need to be forward-looking and face up to some very tough decisions that have been put off for too long. Equipment programmes cannot be based on wish-lists or the fantasy world of what we would like to do if resources were unlimited.

The Review will need to harness our national strengths – our willingness to play a part far beyond our borders, strong public support for our Armed Forces, the character of our fighting men and women, the strength of our defence industry and technologies – to an overall strategy which makes the most effective use of them rather than putting them in a state of permanent overstretch. It must meet the challenges of a turbulent international context and help to reduce our vulnerability at home to threats and hazards.

That means calibrating our role and our capabilities to the sort of conflicts which are most likely to arise in the next twenty years not the last twenty. It means being smarter in using what we can afford. It means deciding what capabilities the UK must itself have, as well as how to complement the capabilities of our Allies, especially the US. It means bringing together more effectively soft and hard power. And it means drastic improvements in our defence equipment acquisition process to avoid the delay, confusion and cost overruns which have become all too familiar. A Conservative government will therefore engage industry in a sustained dialogue on strategy and policy development.

3. Some Fundamental Continuities

The new National Security Strategy, and the accompanying Strategic Defence and Security Review, will be built on certain solid foundations – most have been at the heart of bi-partisan policy over many years, including:

- NATO;
- maintenance of the nuclear deterrent;
- EU cooperation;
- active involvement in international institutions;
- continued determination to prevent nuclear proliferation; and
- maintaining the security of the 2012 Olympic Games.

3.1 NATO

NATO is the single most important institutional framework for intervention, for conflict prevention and for long term regional stabilisation that exists in the world. Even after the end of the Cold War it continues to lie at the core of UK security and ensures the continuing commitment of the United States to the security of an enlarged Europe. The return of France to the integrated military structure is very welcome. Born as an organisation to provide collective security, the review of NATO's Strategic Concept now being undertaken provides an important opportunity bring it up to date. Though in the near future resort to major military intervention may be a less frequently chosen NATO option than in the last decade, the strategic context is such that it most certainly cannot be excluded as a necessary response to hostile action. And Europeans need both the shield in Europe and the capacity for the projection of power beyond Europe which NATO membership gives them. It must remain a forum for transatlantic consultation on politico-military matters.

Forming the framework for coalition operations is the natural task of NATO and will be the context for UK participation in any major combat operations. **In our view, the review of NATO's Strategic Concept is an opportunity to:**

- **give contemporary meaning and practical expression to the concept of collective defence in meeting security challenges** falling short of conflict such as cyber attacks and disruptions to supplies of commodities;
- **increase Alliance partnership activities with friendly non member countries** to create a wider 'pool' of states that it can work with to achieve common objectives;
- **improve and streamline force planning** by cutting back burdensome command structures; ensuring compatibility of capabilities and force structure developed for out of area operations with those needed for the Euro Atlantic area and identifying scenarios in which the US is unlikely to commit substantial forces and would expect Europeans to do more;
- **resolve the duplication between NATO and ESDP** by collocating the military staffs of NATO and the EU to ensure a common force and operational planning system between them and by updating the Berlin Plus arrangements to strengthen the capacity for mutual support. A Conservative government will only support the further development of ESDP if it delivers increased operational capability not already available in NATO, and does not undermine NATO in any way;
- **put in place common funding mechanisms.** Under current arrangements many costs including those for troop contributions are paid by the government concerned which thus pays twice – a disincentivising and unfair burden. An operational fund should be created to which every member state contributed for common funding of shortfalls in crucial operational enablers such as helicopters and the reimbursement of costs.

3.2 Maintaining the nuclear deterrent

The Conservative Party is committed to retaining Britain's minimum strategic nuclear deterrent because, in an uncertain and volatile world, we believe it remains indispensable for our country's national security. We support the decision to renew Britain's submarine-based nuclear deterrent based on the Trident missile system.

Britain is unique among the nuclear weapons states in that we have reduced the UK's nuclear deterrent capability to a single system – Trident. And we have led the way in transparency and accountability about our nuclear weapons. In the context of progress in nuclear disarmament and reduction, the UK must be prepared to take a rigorous look at whether we can take our excellent record in this area further forward.

3.3 EU cooperation

To date, the European Union has been better at writing security strategies than executing them. But it is no good having big ambitions if Europe's own backyard is insecure. NATO remains the indispensable organisation for collective defence in the transatlantic area.

There is much unfinished business flowing from the demise of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe. The enlargement strategy has, by and large, proved hugely successful to date – even if bringing problems with it – but EU capitals and institutions have found it much less easy to develop credible common positions and policies on the EU's periphery where the prospect of enlargement is not available or not immediately so. There is now a half completed project in the Balkans; a half hearted Eastern Partnership; an uncertain relationship with Russia; an ambitious but unfocussed policy in the Mediterranean and a near stalled relationship with Turkey. Tension remains and the risk of renewed conflict cannot be ruled out in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. In each case the EU should be taking a lot of the load. The United States have made their expectations clear. **The Conservative Party will work for more effective European policies on security issues and, in the context of NATO's Review of its Strategic Concept, work for better integration of these with NATO force planning and operational capabilities.**

Russia is integral to security in Europe but for other Europeans is currently a source of tension. Moscow's efforts to have energy consumer clients over an oil barrel means that she is no longer a trusted, even if vital, supplier while her attitude to countries in Eastern Europe which were once part of the Soviet Union, whose sovereignty she seeks to limit, brings about competitive rather than cooperative relationships with the EU in that part of Europe.

It is not in Britain's national interest to be in permanent confrontation with Russia, but a sustained improvement in those relations will require a major effort on both sides. Britain must remain firm in its belief that countries such as the Ukraine and Georgia must be free to determine their futures. It is in Russia's national interest to work more effectively with the US, Britain and other Western nations on global issues such as non-proliferation. As part of seeking a cooperative relationship with Russia, it is important that the UK, EU member states and institutions should develop a shared analysis. **With a Conservative government the door will be open to improved relations with Russia. We shall see if a door opens in return.**

In the Balkans, where the EU holds the key to security and stability, Europeans must tackle the continuing instability and drive the enlargement project to a successful conclusion.

The place of Islam in Europe is relevant to both domestic and external security policy. Though many differences remain, threads of shared approaches between European governments are beginning to emerge on domestic policies in relation to Muslim minorities. But there is sharp division on key external aspects, notably Turkey's application to join the EU. Damaging policy drift is underway. Some European governments argue that the fact of being a Muslim majority country disqualifies Turkey despite the commitment to the principle of membership under the Association agreement. The Conservative Party strongly disagrees with this analysis and **will work for Turkish membership of the EU**, which would strengthen European security in an unstable part of the world.

3.4 Active involvement in international institutions

The UN possesses a unique and indispensable legal base for international action, as well as financial resources and expertise. But despite sustained efforts at reform, the UN system is still not fully fit for purpose. The requirements are threefold: to end inefficient and wasteful administrative practices; to reform/redistribute power within the UN system, including with the international financial institutions (IFIs) to reflect current political realities; and to make progress in reducing the

underlying strategic disagreement between the Western P5 and Russia and China which too often blocks action in the Security Council.

None of the UN's problems will be easily remedied. This does not however detract from the importance of continuing efforts to bring about UN reform, about which the UK should continue to be active if not starry eyed, while seeking practical routes forward to resolving blocked or stalemated issues.

Other institutions, such as the G20 and regional organisations, act in addition to the UN system but ultimately in support of it and must therefore also be strengthened. They also provide the UK with a wider range of potential partners.

A Conservative government will work towards:

- **reforming and tackling the institutional weaknesses of the UN** by broadening the membership of the UN Security Council to reflect the global redistribution of power, including membership for Germany, Japan, Brazil and India and African representation; improving the functioning of the General Assembly and of the UN's capacity to bring its Agencies effectively to bear on conflict prevention;
- **consolidating and updating important international treaty regimes bearing directly on security**, notably the Non-Proliferation Treaty and securing a successor treaty to Kyoto;
- **developing the capacity of the G20 to act as an inclusive and effective international steering mechanism** and, alongside this, reforming the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to reflect today's balance of economic power; increasing their capability for early warning;
- **improving the effectiveness and capacity of regional organisations** which often act in support of UN Resolutions, as set out in our Green Paper on International Development (e.g. the African Union);
- **developing the capacity of the Commonwealth to take a leading role in conflict prevention and recovery from state failure**; and
- **exercising influence through and ensuring the EU uses its collective weight in relation to key security issues**, including Iran's nuclear programme, Russia, energy security, and the Balkans.

3.5 Countering weapons proliferation

Under a Conservative government, the UK will make non-proliferation one of its top international priorities. Individual states must themselves take action to reduce the proliferation and hostile exploitation of technologies but ultimately this challenge requires multinational management at the level of regional and international institutions.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

We are facing a new era of nuclear insecurity which, left unchecked, could lead to the unravelling of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has been a fundamental pillar of our global security for the last four decades. We therefore must act now while there is a remaining chance of turning this tide. The current British Government have been slow to develop ideas and provide international leadership on the reform of the NPT, leaving it until the end of their third term and the approach of the Review Conference to push any determined initiative of their own.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty must be revived and strengthened to contain existing risks and to prevent the initiation of new programmes with potentially calamitous long term effects on international stability as well as on existing balances of power. Part of the way forward with Iran's nuclear programme is to make the programme part of a wider agenda appealing to a wider audience. Tehran gets attention with her claim that she can only assert her right to nuclear energy by behaving the way she does – the implicit charge being that nuclear nations do not honour the bargain at the root of the NPT treaty. So a Conservative government will make non-proliferation one of its top international priorities. We will work to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime in the following ways:

- propose **strategic dialogue between the five recognised nuclear weapons powers** Britain, the United States, France, Russia and China on how to:

-
- achieve reductions in nuclear stockpiles;
 - reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation or accidental nuclear war; and
 - make progress on our disarmament commitments;
- take steps to **close the loopholes in the Non-Proliferation Treaty**, including urging the adoption of a new UN Security Council resolution that automatically brings any country that breaches the NPT or withdraws from it before the UN Security Council;
 - secure agreement to a **mechanism to bring the nuclear fuel cycle under international control**. Whether it takes the form of international partnerships of a small number of states producing nuclear fuel, or a network of ‘fuel banks’, these proposals must be adopted and implemented as soon as is practicable. Addressing the dangers of the nuclear fuel cycle will make it possible to launch wider efforts to make the peaceful applications of nuclear technology available to all those countries who desire it;
 - advocate **additional funds and powers for the International Atomic Energy Agency**. The safeguards budget of the IAEA is not more than the budget of the police department of the city in which it is located yet it monitors hundreds of nuclear facilities across the world. The Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA extra inspection powers, ought to be made a universal requirement for all countries within the NPT;
 - **improve the international capacity to block the trade in nuclear weapons technology** and to isolate countries engaged in such trafficking. We will seek to strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative to increase our ability to interdict suspect vessels. The PSI currently has no international secretariat, no shared databases, and no established funding. Key countries such as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan and Egypt remain outside the PSI, as do India, China, and the Republic of Korea;
 - **disrupt the financial networks that support the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**. We must urgently develop the capacity at a national and international level to further isolate nuclear proliferators from the international financial system. We must ensure that we have the right expertise and experience within our government departments to keep on top of this fast-expanding area and the capacity to assist other countries to do so. Our collective security against nuclear proliferation could be shattered by a single point of vulnerability;
 - **deal more resolutely with existing cases of nuclear proliferation**. First and foremost this means a step change in the international community’s response to Iran’s nuclear programme and an increased level of dialogue on sanctions and security concerns with Middle Eastern and Gulf countries most affected by Iran’s nuclear programme;
 - **negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty** to ban future production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium; and
 - **seek stronger enforcement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty**.

Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention

A Conservative government will **use the period leading to the 2011 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention Review Conference to identify solutions for an effective verification and monitoring mechanism for the implementation of, and adherence to, this treaty.**

Chemical Weapons Convention

A Conservative government will **undertake work to identify the loopholes in the Chemical Weapons Convention, and push for international solutions to these.**

3.6 Maintaining security of the 2012 Olympic Games

The 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will take place in a number of locations around the UK but primarily in a specially built site in East London in the Lea Valley between 27 July and 12 August 2012. 2012 is a crowded year in the UK public calendar as it will also see the celebration of The Queen's Diamond Jubilee and approximately 150 annual events in London, including such events as the Shakespeare Festival and the Notting Hill Carnival.

If elected, a Conservative government will inherit the responsibility for ensuring a safe and secure Games along with other public events. This will require the integration, in a short space of time, of many of the aspects of security outlined in this Green Paper. We are therefore already monitoring closely the Government's preparations. On entering office, a Conservative government will conduct an audit and review of the implementation to that point of the Olympic Safety and Security Strategy to ensure that delivery is on target and the work done to that date sufficient. Our inclination will be against making significant organisational changes before the Olympics unless there are compelling security reasons for doing so.

4. Changes Needed

The new, integrated approach to national security will mean some major changes. In particular, it will involve:

- a liberal Conservative attitude to foreign policy, which champions an enlightened vision of the national interest;
- building a capacity for preventative action;
- a more integrated approach to post-conflict reconstruction – with a new Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force;
- a new emphasis on domestic security;
- a new focus on our capacity to deal with emergencies;
- increased attention to the resilience of critical infrastructure; and
- a new concern with ensuring that security legislation does not compromise civil liberties, and with strengthening social cohesion.

4.1 A liberal Conservative foreign policy

As we enter 2010, we depend, as we have always done, on a stable international environment in which to trade and earn our living as a country. We have huge investments abroad, and a fifth of our citizens live overseas. In today's 'just in time' economy, we have as big an interest as we have ever done in keeping the sea lanes free and open.

Our national interest therefore requires our continued full and active engagement in world affairs. But our international role is not only one of self interest, nor should it be seen purely through the prism of a commercial balance sheet.

Under a Conservative government there will be a distinctive British foreign policy, renewing and reinforcing our engagement with the rest of the world.

In addition to the creation of a true National Security Council to integrate properly at the highest levels of government the work of our foreign, defence, energy, home and international development departments, we have adopted four additional themes to guide our approach to foreign affairs:

- strong commitment to the transatlantic alliance. The United States remains our indispensable partner in diplomacy, intelligence and security. Our relationship should be one of permanent friendship coupled with honest criticism;
- the deepening of alliances beyond Europe and North America: this means using our co-ordination of our domestic departments to elevate entire national relationships, in culture, commerce and education as well as in diplomacy, with nations in the Gulf, and others in North Africa, Latin America and South Asia;
- the reform of older international institutions such as the United Nations and the effective use of new ones such as the G20, and the updating of vital international treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
- the upholding of our own values, not by imposing them on others but by being an inspiring example of them ourselves. That is why we place such importance on the reinvigoration of our development aid and why we see such a strong role for the British Council and the foreign language services of the BBC.

4.2 Building a capacity for preventative action

Deployment of national instruments at an early stage to deal with the causes of a problem can avert the need to spend vast sums later on large-scale intervention and reconstruction. This approach is both moral and sensible.

Conflict prevention has to be grounded in the sort of foreign policy outlined above – one which is broad in scope and reach, based on the principles to which the British people adhere at home, of liberal democracy and individual responsibility, and which has many tools at its disposal. At its heart must lie the capacity for both early warning and strategic assessment

of potential or emerging risk and instability, and for sustained and patient action which aims to create conditions conducive to stability both within and between states. This includes actions along a spectrum to:

- minimise potential sources of instability and conflict before conflict arises;
- tackle contributing conditions and influence the decision-making of relevant actors as tension rises; and
- manage and mitigate crises when they occur.⁵

A greater role for diplomacy

Over the years, the UK has manifested a considerable talent for diplomacy – bilateral and multilateral – which has been an admired strength in pursuing British interests abroad. But over the last decade, our diplomatic capability, centred on the FCO, has been neglected. We should make more of our diplomats’ knowledge and expertise. A Conservative government will ensure that our diplomatic service is at the heart of the development and implementation of our National Security Strategy.

While recognising that the capacity to back diplomacy with the threat of the use of force will remain essential to its ultimate credibility, **reviving the capacity of the FCO to conduct effective diplomacy on behalf of HMG is a priority for a Conservative government.** This will be achieved by increasing the FCO’s area expertise and bringing it back into the centre of Whitehall, including through a leading role in the National Security Council.

Conflict prevention requires sustained patient diplomacy in both bilateral and multilateral contexts. **A challenging and exceptionally important negotiating agenda comes to the fore in relation to the Nuclear Non Proliferation regime and associated measures, the strengthening of which is crucial to increasing the prospects of long term conflict reduction in the Middle East, international stability more generally and a safer world in the long term.**

In the battle of competing ‘narratives’ that will characterise the future strategic context, maintaining influence and public support in the UK and abroad will be important. An important component of this will be **explaining how UK actions at home and abroad help promote liberal democratic values.**

A wider range of government departments supporting diplomacy

The Comprehensive Approach that NATO is developing in Afghanistan, involving close civil-military cooperation in a single strategy, is widely regarded as essential to the chances of success. Broadly speaking the same approach applies to conflict prevention.

Development assistance has a central role to play here. But we must focus on good governance and fostering the democratic institutions – the courts, civil society and police forces – that are the bedrock of more prosperous societies and the resolving of differences without resort to the gun. **DFID and the FCO need to work closely together on an agreed agenda.** Just as at home the means of overcoming poverty depends on creating the conditions in which families can help themselves, so abroad, as we have set out in our Green Paper on International Development, **development assistance needs to focus on creating the political and social conditions for fostering indigenous wealth creation as the best way of overcoming the drivers of insecurity and radicalisation: poverty, inequality and poor governance; and on helping societies adapt to security risks such as climate change, resource scarcity and pandemics.** Achieving this will encourage long-term stability and improve the chances of people in fragile societies and poorer countries of achieving the purposes of the Millennium Development Goals themselves. Other non-military elements too need to be given greater weight as instruments of security policy and the resources of other departments in Whitehall should be made available to respond to specific needs (for example, the education departments, Ministry of Justice and Home Office).

Defence diplomacy, capacity building, security sector reform, joint training and exercises led by the MoD can, over the long-term, make a major contribution to conflict prevention and reducing the risks of instability. Assistance in disaster recovery creates immense goodwill and maintains the authority of governments which might otherwise be vulnerable to extremists and criminals. All of these activities enhance UK influence and make a contribution to conflict prevention. Just as the FCO, DFID and other departments should expect to contribute to UK success in the context of hybrid warfare, so **the MoD should regard it as a priority to play a substantial role in policies which contribute to the prevention of conflict.**

4.3 A more integrated approach to post-conflict reconstruction

Change is needed to bring about a whole government effort that will deliver results on the ground in crucial missions like the one in Afghanistan. As the Conservative Party's Green Paper on International Development emphasises, we need a step change in the UK's civil-military development capabilities.

The experience of Iraq and Afghanistan is that we need to go even further in making sure that, as a country, we can contribute rapidly and in full measure to stabilisation activities both before and after conflict. If the comprehensive approach is to be effective there must be:

- **unity of purpose** and common strategies between military, police and civilian organisations;
- **clear command and control within and between military and civilian agencies, both at national and international levels;**
- **the ability and willingness on the part of civilians to deploy and operate in dangerous environments; and**
- **joint training facilities and exercises for military, police, intelligence and civilian personnel.**

A Conservative government will therefore create a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force which will bring together the skills necessary to carry out vital stabilisation work.

The Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force will be capable of working in high risk environments, and carrying out crucial activities to deliver stability and win hearts and minds – from building bridges and repairing power supplies to helping to build local governance structures and capacity.

It will include military personnel, including civil and military affairs personnel and engineers, as well as designated officials from DFID, the FCO and other relevant departments.

Our Strategic Defence and Security Review will examine how this reconstruction capacity should be configured and how it should be built into our expeditionary forces. As a joint security capability, it will be an exemplar of cross departmental funding.

The Strategic Defence and Security Review, which will consider strategic defence and security policies in the light of the resources available, will also examine the most appropriate funding mechanism for the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force. This could include drawing on the existing £269 million Stabilisation Fund. In addition, the Strategic Defence and Security Review will examine the scope for allocating some funding from the international aid budget, consistent with the OECD rules on the classification of overseas aid, which will increase under a Conservative government to 0.7 per cent of GDP by 2013.

The Stabilisation and Reconstruction Force will be overseen by the new cross-departmental National Security Council, which will bring together foreign and domestic policy considerations across government and ensure a coherent approach to national security issues.

4.4 A new emphasis on domestic security

Effective border control is the first line of defence against the entry of unwanted persons – extremists, terrorists and criminals – and illegal goods like drugs. The formation of the UK Border Agency brought together the immigration service and parts of HM Revenue and Customs but has not solved the problem of disjointed policing of the UK's borders. Key duties are either not carried out or are performed to differing standards in different places. Component organisations involved in border policing duties focus on narrow issues specific to their remit rather than on an overall strategy for border security with resulting inefficiencies and gaps. There is inadequate surveillance of our extended coastline. A Conservative government will:

- bring together the functions of those organisations involved in the protective security of ports and airports to **form a unified border policing capability;** and
- **review current systems and arrangements for achieving awareness of and responding to activities in UK coastal and near waterways,** including the Channel which is one of the busiest shipping lanes of the world, with a view to ensuring more comprehensive and accurate coverage to prevent the approach to the UK of any vessel with dangerous cargoes or passengers.

In Northern Ireland, devolution should contribute to greater stability. But a Conservative government will continue to give our fullest support to the police and other agencies in their efforts to combat the threat to the security of the whole United Kingdom from dissident republican and other terrorist organisations.

4.5 A new focus on our capacity to deal with emergencies, including through the establishment of a new Permanent Military Command for Homeland Defence and Security

Maintaining territorial integrity and safety becomes both more important and more difficult as terrorists and organised criminals evolve new modes of operation, and as natural hazards increase in scale and frequency.

Military contribution to homeland security and resilience

The military is best placed to provide agile and innovative command and control capabilities in support of the civil power when natural events are of such a scale, pace and danger that the emergency services cannot be expected to have adequate situational awareness and/or are in danger of being overwhelmed. And in relation to doctrine, the military is well placed to support appropriate changes to that of the emergency services to meet evolving terrorist techniques. So a Conservative government will:

- **establish a small permanent military command or headquarters for homeland defence and security**, including the security of territorial waters and airspace, building on the existing facilities at the Permanent Joint Headquarters. This command will provide a single focus for operational demands on Forces for homeland roles and for developing and delivering a coherent response with the large number of emergency responders; and
- **ensure there is a predictable, rather than declaratory, regular armed force contribution to homeland tasks**. At the moment military contributions are dependent upon there being sufficient numbers of personnel and capabilities available and not on deployment abroad. Military support to the civil power, other than in the case of a few niche capabilities, is therefore only declaratory. Civilian first responders such as police and fire services therefore find it difficult currently to include the military in their planning.

Standards for emergency services

Emergency services increasingly need to operate across different force boundaries and with other forces. The Conservative Party believes in the operational independence and local accountability of the emergency services but this should not be a barrier to the ability of responders to work together during emergencies which is currently hindered by a lack of national standards for response procedures and equipment.⁶ A Conservative government will **insist on national standards within and between emergency services for effective technical and process interoperability**.

Involving individuals, communities and businesses in building their own safety and security

It is neither possible nor desirable in a free society for government to try to provide against all the threats and hazards individuals may face. Unlike the Cold War, security does not lie greatly in the preservation of state power or in its exercise but in the capacity of a society as a whole to work together in a crisis. To date however, the government has acted to stifle personal initiative and in the case of response to emergencies has placed all responsibility on professional practitioners (although Operations Griffin and Argus are welcome developments that engage parts of the private sector). The state must certainly act effectively where only it can do so as in the case of the current swine flu pandemic and it needs to do much more than now to enable individuals to become more self reliant. **It is neither desirable nor affordable not to involve individuals in the safety and security of communities and businesses they know best.**

By adapting behaviour, **local communities can make a big contribution to the long term drivers of insecurity and to their impact on their local environment**. In the case of climate change, for example, individual decisions are crucial to timely transition to a low carbon economy.⁷ Communities and businesses can also insist on better building and planning regulations to help reduce the effects in built up areas of natural hazards and terrorist attacks. And minority communities can be in the forefront of helping their own integration into wider society.

The British people have traditionally been very adept at assuming individual responsibility and participating in local life. Many voluntary activities take place at local level such as the Scout and Cadet movements, St Johns Ambulance, British Red Cross, Womens' Institute, Neighbourhood Policing Groups and interfaith groups, all of which can be strong forces in

responding to emergencies and binding communities together. **A Conservative government will work with other groups, businesses and individuals to:**

- **provide better, more interactive and easily accessible, information about risks** and about the measures individuals can take to prevent or prepare for emergencies or do in their event. The National Risk Register and Community Risk Registers do not yet provide this useful information;
- **on a voluntary basis, tap local knowledge and specialist skills, provide help with training in emergency procedures and encourage involvement in exercising;**
- **help link local groups to national emergency response procedures. The work of the Local Resilience Fora is a start but could usefully be taken much further, as demonstrated by continental examples such as the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (Technisches Hilfswerk); and**
- **foster corporate contributions to emergency assistance and support for resilience.** The insurance industry should, for instance, incentivise companies to meet the continuity standards as set out in BS25999 through the premiums offered to those businesses which conform.

4.6 Increased attention to the resilience of critical infrastructure

The nine essential sectors of daily life – energy, food, water, transport, telecommunications, government and public services, emergency services, health and finance – must be able to withstand and respond to extreme events such as terrorist attacks and natural hazards. These sectors have international supply chains underpinning the delivery of their services to customers which must also be flexible enough to adapt to changes in supply and demand.

To date, work has mostly focussed on ensuring physical protection of critical infrastructure in relation to terrorism. Much less attention has been paid to protecting infrastructure against natural hazards and the longer range but equally important issue of the capacity of that infrastructure to cope with emergencies and long-term trends. There is also a great deal of ignorance in government about its underlying condition and extent of vulnerability. This approach is not strategic and carries the big risk of the country's critical infrastructure being neither resilient in crisis nor sustainable over time. With the cooperation of private sector owners, systematic mapping and modelling is urgently needed to include knowledge of:

- international supply chains, particularly when from or transiting through high risk and unstable areas;
- the location and physical state of UK critical national infrastructure;
- the interdependencies, capacity and redundancy of essential sectors to withstand and respond to extreme events and long-term trends (e.g. socio-demographic);
- regulatory arrangements in each sector;
- vulnerabilities of key installations and protections in place;
- foreign ownership of critical assets; and
- relevant computer networks and space based technologies essential to normal functioning.

The mapping and modelling will provide a basis for:

- **the development of agreed minimum national standards for each sector;**
- **a phased programme of essential upgrades of infrastructures based on these agreed national resilience standards;**
- **reflection in departmental priorities of the FCO and MoD of the importance to the UK of the international supply chains of essential commodities;**
- **any needed changes in the current remits of Regulators to enable them to require continuity of service and security of supply;**

-
- **ensuring the security and adequate capacity of computer networks and space based technologies which control the functioning of essential sectors, with consideration being given to designating space and computer systems themselves parts of the critical national infrastructure (CNI); and**
 - **reviewing and strengthening the current inadequate and inconsistent levels of protective policing services (in particular armed policing) provided to the critical infrastructure, with a view to achieving the enhanced delivery of such policing services to a number of key sites.**

Security of basic commodities and essential services

The combination of population growth and emerging markets is putting pressure on the supply of basic commodities which is likely to be long term in nature. Conflict may also disrupt essential supply lines. No doubt in the case of some commodities, technological development will help relieve pressure but in the short and medium term there may well still be the threat of shortages. It is not possible to deal within the scope of this paper with all the possibilities and only two, with particular relevance to the UK, are discussed substantively: the security of our energy supplies and of our computer systems, both of which are essential to the functioning of the economy and ordinary daily life and highly vulnerable. It is worth noting briefly however that the security of food supplies about which the Conservative Party has spoken,⁸ will need to be monitored within the NSC machinery for its resilience. There are moves to create autarkic trading in food (farming land being bought in Africa for instance by Saudi Arabia to feed her own population) while the resort to biofuels as a solution to the energy crisis puts further pressure on world food supplies.

Energy security

In 2006, Tony Blair said that ‘in the future, energy security will be almost as important as defence to the overall security of a country’s interest’.⁹ But, characteristically, Labour did not follow through. The danger that the country now faces of a real risk of the lights going out – inadequate power to keep the economy going – was entirely predictable even before Tony Blair spoke and yet his government did virtually nothing.¹⁰ Taken together, the lack of resilience in the UK’s stretched power generation, strained energy transmission, insecurity of energy supply and lack of emergency storage is nothing short of alarming. **Forming a coherent energy policy, joining domestic with overseas factors, security with long term climate change goals and private sector investment with government policies on resilience of systems will be an urgent Conservative priority on entering office** and is an example of an approach that can be applied to other essential sectors. This is discussed in detail in Annex 2.

Cyber security

The threat specific to computer systems and networks which underpin all essential sectors and aspects of daily life has characteristics similar in complexity to that of the broader terrorist threat: it is international and multifaceted. It is difficult to differentiate between cyber events that are believed to be criminal – whether organised criminals or lone individuals and petty hackers – and those that are caused by states or state sponsored actors. The acute dependence of modern Western economies and societies on the integrity and security of their cyber systems means that any vulnerability can have massive cascading repercussions well outside the sector in which it is located. Security has to be the object of close, continuous and specialised attention.

Currently there are many different agencies working in this area – GCHQ, the Ministry of Defence, Security Service, Metropolitan Police, SOCA and others – but, as with the terrorist threat before the creation of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), they share neither a common operating picture nor threat assessment. As a result, too little is known about the extent of vulnerability or scale of the challenge of providing enhanced security.

In June 2009, the Government said that they would set up a ‘Cyber Security Operations Centre’ at Cheltenham. But this Centre is not yet operational. Even when it is operational, the Centre is only intended to analyse the threats – not to do anything about them. We can’t go on like this. The UK needs to be able to detect and prevent attacks before they hit us. In other words, it needs a proactive and effective capability to respond to cyber attacks. At the moment no organisation brings together all the arms of government to deliver a single response capability, and that is what a Conservative government will task the Cyber Security Operations Centre to do. **A Conservative government will set up a Cyber Threat and Assessment Centre (CTAC), by building on the existing Cyber Security Operations Centre to provide a common operating picture, threat assessment and situational awareness to users. It will act as the single reporting point for all cyber-related incidents. This will lay the foundation for the development of a National Operations Centre able to respond to cyber events.**

Alongside CTAC, there must be **greater sharing of cyber-related intelligence on a multinational** basis to improve situational awareness.

Finally, as these systems underpin all aspects of daily life it is vital that the skills gap in this area be addressed. Individuals at all levels of law enforcement must be ‘cyber literate’ and the gap in national digital forensics capability be addressed. Furthermore, the UK could usefully establish a Cyber Challenge (modelled on the Challenge that is already up and running in the US, funded by the private sector) which aims to develop understanding, especially among young people, of the need to use the internet responsibly in the interests of their own privacy and safety, and to develop their skills to enlarge the pool of talent available for employment in cyber-related roles.

4.7 Striking the right balance – ensuring security while protecting civil liberties and social cohesion

The long-term strategic challenge to the UK both abroad and at home is from the extremism that fuels alienation, violence and terrorism. If they are to provide security on a sustainable basis, security measures must be proportional, consistent with liberal democratic values and the rule of law. A Conservative government will **review and consolidate national security-related legislation to ensure its compatibility with fundamental rights and freedoms**. As part of this process it will:

- **ensure that all UK government departments and agencies honour our obligations in respect of human rights and the prohibition of torture;**
- **review the Control Order system** with a view to reducing reliance on it and, consistent with security, replacing it;
- **continue to explore ways to allow the use of intercept as evidence** in court cases to increase the chances of successful prosecution of terrorist suspects;
- **review the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act** to limit the exercise of surveillance and interception powers to national security, the pursuit of serious organised crime, and maintenance of national economic wellbeing, and to those bodies and persons properly authorised;
- **review jurisprudence relating to ECHR to permit deportation of foreign nationals** who pose a threat to the security and public order; and
- **review relevant national databases and systems** to develop a clear statement of purpose for each in line with the principles of proportionality and necessity, and to develop adequate governance regimes including strengthening and adequately resourcing the Information Commissioner’s Office. For example, the Conservative Party has already said that Labour’s national ID card system will be abolished and the police DNA database run and regulated on the model of the system applying in Scotland. The solutions proposed by the Government’s Intercept Modernisation Programme (IMP) will also be reviewed.

Building an integrated and cohesive society

This country has been the victim of terrorism but we forget at our peril that most of those involved in plots in this country were born and brought up here and have been strongly influenced by extremists who attack the values of democratic societies and advocate their violent overthrow.

Lack of integration and social cohesion in the UK lies at the root. Too often communities lead parallel lives with little if any real interaction, with the result that instead of diversity being a source of strength to the UK, society has become more divided and segregated. In this situation, extremism across the religious and political spectrum can more readily take hold and lead to violence.

There are several contributory factors. Labour’s outdated state multiculturalism, which has entrenched difference, division and suspicion between communities is one. The government claims to have abandoned earlier policies which promoted the separation of groups in society by entrenching a ‘right to difference’, including in language, rather than ‘the right to equal treatment despite difference’. But in practice Labour remains obsessed with dealing with groups and communities collectively and funding them on this basis – as if individual rights and identity can properly be subordinated to a group position. This approach encourages different communities to compete with each other for funding, resources and Government patronage, reinforcing divisions and tensions between them.

Other failed or perverse policies are involved in creating an environment where individuals become vulnerable to extremism. Lack of opportunity is a contributor and must be tackled through, for instance, education reform. A key error however, is Labour's exclusive focus on 'violent extremism' and on the narrow ambition of protecting people from physical violence. But as violence is the effect rather than the cause of social division, Labour's 'Preventing Violent Extremism' programme can at best aspire only to be a containment policy which fails to achieve solutions.

There is indeed a philosophical gulf between Labour and the Conservative Party on the way to bring about greater integration of British society. Labour makes far too little effort to ensure that public money goes only to institutions which observe the law and individuals who support British values. And it drives policy from central government rather than working through local communities where the battle for ideas ultimately takes place and investing in such local institutions as schools to bring together children from different backgrounds. In failing vigorously to promote as shared inheritance liberal democratic values and knowledge of British institutions and history, and by being slow in condemning unacceptable cultural practices, Labour has little hope of combatting successfully the extremism that leads to violence. In other words, Labour does not have a national integration strategy and works badly with local authorities to deliver cohesion strategies. This has given rise to an environment in which extremism can flourish. It is essential therefore that integration and cohesion policies are based on treating people as being British rather than as members of special interest groups.

The increasing frustration felt by many involved in Labour's Prevent Strategy is a reflection of this confused and mistaken approach. While no religious or political ideology has a monopoly on extremism or violence and while security assessments identify that the main threat to this country as coming from those who exploit Islam for political ends, it is also the case that different forms of extremism tend to reinforce each other – as evidenced by the simultaneous rise in far right groups. It is not just minority groups that need a sense of identity and understanding of values.

Recognising that government has a key role to play in fostering a society resilient to extremism, particularly by promoting a strong identity and values for all Britons, a Conservative government will:

- **develop a national integration strategy** which promotes the common English language and a sense of a shared history as the cornerstones of a successful community. This should be a priority for all educational establishments in particular; and
- **work with local authorities to deliver localised cohesion strategies** which promote activities that increase contact and integration between communities.

These steps will help build communities able to resist terrorism, but will not by themselves overcome the process of radicalisation. The Prevent Strategy should therefore:

- **combat extremism which promotes violence or hatred, not just violent extremism.** Government must take the lead in promoting shared values and set an example for individuals by:
 - preventing propagators of hate from entering the country and actively preventing the import and dissemination of extremist written material and speech which promotes hatred and violence. The police must exercise their powers to take down websites which violate the law;
 - denying organisations and individuals which promote extremism access to public funding and facilities, actively enforcing this prohibition and reporting cases publicly, and encouraging private organisations to deny access to their facilities;
 - monitoring the conformity of all charitable organisations with the law; and
 - supporting activities at local level which help draw vulnerable individuals away from extremism.
- **support those most vulnerable to radicalisation, and those already radicalised, through targeted intervention strategies (including funding).** This includes tackling the problem of radicalisation in vulnerable places like prisons. The growth of extremism within prisons is serious and much remains to be done to develop and implement guidance across the Prison Service to help it to develop effective counter strategies (for example, education programmes). In relation to the management of extremists within the prison system, experience in other countries needs to be examined for best practice and for ways forward in rehabilitation and deradicalisation.

-
- **integrate counter terrorism tasking into effective community policing.** It is for government at all levels and individuals to inculcate the right values in society and not the function of the police. But the police have important roles in two respects:
 - to share information with community leaders, schools and youth and community services about local vulnerability to extremism to allow these bodies to intervene in ways which do not criminalise individuals but move them away from ideas or activities which would lead to criminality. Effective partnerships between the police, public bodies and community groups and leaders are essential to this;¹¹ and
 - to develop trusting relationships within communities so that individuals themselves are forthcoming with information about risk, as communities, families and friends are best placed to notice the early and subtle indicators of disaffection.

Just as extremists exploit divided communities and vulnerable individuals, so do organised criminals. As with counterterrorism, there needs to be much more focus than now by the police at the local level where growth to larger scale criminal activity should be halted.

Annex 1: Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

The consequences of international intervention failing to establish Afghanistan as a country stable enough to be able to provide for its own security would be immense. But until very recently, the Government have shied away from trying to explain to the British people the vital national security reasons behind the Armed Forces' mission in Afghanistan or its relationship to policy towards Pakistan. This has seriously undermined public confidence in it.

Three quarters of the most serious terrorist plots investigated in the UK have been shown to have direct links with the borderland of Pakistan next door to Afghanistan. The threat to UK security from this region remains current and substantial. Apart from the serious damage done to the credibility of NATO, failing to secure Afghanistan would contribute to the further destabilisation of Pakistan, with direct consequences for UK security; to the increase in tension and risk of terrorism in the subcontinent as a whole; and would act as a boost to extremism and terrorism worldwide.

With other coalition forces, which should bear their fair share of the load, **UK troops should engage in counterinsurgency against the Taliban to deny extremists and terrorists a renewed foothold in Afghanistan, which would result in the further destabilisation of the state of Pakistan, by laying the base for Afghan leaders to assume responsibility for the security and protection of their own people.**

The approach of a Conservative government

Together, Afghanistan and Pakistan will be the single most important foreign policy and military commitment of an incoming Conservative government. It will deliver policy more effectively by giving leadership to the nation and improving decision making in government.

Currently, Whitehall is not well organised to deliver policy effectively. The convoluted structure of a Ministerial 'Trilat' composed of the FCO, MoD and DFID alongside an Afghanistan Strategy Group, an Afghanistan Senior Officials Group and a Cabinet Office Afghanistan Strategy Team will be replaced by a standing item on the agendas of the regular meetings of the National Security Council at Ministerial and deputy levels. **A Conservative government will simplify the structures for developing and delivering strategy by having by one official level group in the National Security Secretariat to which Departments will report up to the National Security Council.**

As regards policy, based on the principle that coalition forces do not seek a permanent presence or regional dominance, but are in Afghanistan to assist the people to take control of their own security, a Conservative government will:

- be committed to ensuring that UK military commanders in Afghanistan have the right equipment and troop numbers, based on an agreed assessment of operational need;
- increase the capacity of Afghan security forces – Afghan National Army, Afghan police and auxiliary (tribally based) forces – to provide protection to the population. Training the Afghan army and police is essential but to be sustainable and to undercut the appeal of the Taliban, security also needs to be delivered at tribal and village level as well;
- help ensure strong co-ordination of the international civilian effort in Afghanistan, and effective working relationships with the Afghan government and coalition forces;
- match the military element of the strategy and surge with a political strategy in Afghanistan by encouraging President Karzai to tackle corruption; improving governance, including at local levels; actively encouraging and taking steps to facilitate the political integration and of those prepared to come across from supporting the Taliban; supporting the Afghan-led reconciliation programme;
- match the coalition's military and political work in Afghanistan by: assisting Pakistan in conducting effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations against all groups posing a threat to the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan through the provision of equipment and training to the Pakistan Armed Forces and local security forces in the frontier provinces; and supporting economic and social development, other capacity building programmes and improved governance at national and local levels; and
- as a key part of the coalition's political strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, strengthen weak regional relationships through consultation and confidence-building measures.

Annex 2: Energy Security

Energy supply is critical for the functioning of all parts of society.

After decades as an energy-secure nation, safely reliant on fossil fuel supplies from the North Sea, the United Kingdom has in the last decade added itself to the long list of import-dependent nations. But the Government have been irresponsibly slow to respond to a fundamentally changed situation of loss of national energy self sufficiency at a time when world demand is increasing. And they had plenty of warning of future trends.

In 2004, the UK became a net importer of fuel. In 2005, the UK returned to being a net-importer of primary oils and, in the same year, started to import Liquefied Natural Gas for the first time since the early 1980s. This dependency is set to continue. Latest estimates show that by 2020, 39 to 43 per cent of energy will be imported, and that by 2025, 47 to 50 per cent of the UK's energy supply will come from abroad.

These imports come from volatile regions like the Middle East, where political instability, terrorism and piracy pose real risks to supplies. As state control over commodities increases, so does resource nationalism. This was demonstrated by disputes between Russia and Ukraine with knock-on effects for the rest of Europe. So even when supplies come from partners like Norway, the nature of the UK's contracts mean that it is actually in competition for them with continental customers.

At the same time, the Government have allowed the UK's domestic capacity to withstand crises to be degraded. Over the next decade the UK will lose one third of its electricity generating capacity. Labour have failed to ensure that the margin of supply over demand is maintained, in the face of so many plant retirements. According to the Government's own projections this will result in a significantly higher level of power cuts by 2017.¹² Furthermore, decisions on key technologies such as nuclear, offshore wind and smart meters have been repeatedly delayed, further undermining Britain's ability to provide for its energy needs.

And there is no breathing space. Britain has just sixteen days of gas storage capacity. This compares to much larger storage capacities elsewhere in Europe – 99 days in Germany and 122 days in France. In the face of the multiplicity of risks in the international market place and the vulnerability of the UK to them, this is not enough to assure supply through the sorts of crises – whether political or climatic – which could develop.

The way forward: how should government lead?

It is very clear that in this vital sector the UK is far from either secure or resilient. This is not the place for a full discussion of future UK energy strategy under a Conservative government, which will be published separately. But it is clear that given the need to adapt to the demands of climate change and in an era of tight, often politically controlled, global energy markets which are likely to persist for decades, a totally laissez faire approach is simply inadequate to protect the national interest.

To improve security and resilience of energy supply, a Conservative government will:

- **ensure that energy security is high in FCO priorities.** Diplomatic effort and representation should reflect UK strategic energy interests and security of supply. In particular, we need to catch up with other countries in securing long-term energy supply contracts;
- **reflect energy security concerns in the tasking of the Armed Forces.** The MoD should have regard to energy security in the tasking of our Armed Forces, for example the Royal Navy in the security of the sea lanes and the safety of maritime traffic;
- **develop a role for NATO.** NATO must develop, in doctrinal and practical ways, the concepts of solidarity and mutual assistance in the context of threats to energy security as part of the operational underpinning given to collective security in the twenty first century. NATO navies should cooperate with other navies to help police supply lines;
- **push for a co-ordinated European policy.** To date EU governments have been unable to agree fully on two aspects of policy crucial to energy security at affordable prices or the link between them: policy towards the biggest local supplier of gas – Russia, and the extent of liberalisation of the European market. Getting agreement remains an important short and medium term priority; and
- **increase gas storage capacity.** Against the risk profile established through monitoring of global supply and demand, we will ensure the additional capacity required for an adequate level of UK gas storage is built.

Annex 3: Structure of the National Resilience Team

The Critical Infrastructure and Crowded Places Unit will have responsibility for:

- assessing the state of the UK's critical infrastructure (including physical state and security, supply chains, interdependencies, foreign ownership, redundancy and capacity);
- assessing the capacity of the country's critical infrastructure to withstand/respond to emergencies and to meet long-term socio-demographic trends;
- building a picture of risk and vulnerability in and across essential sectors;
- reporting annually to the National Security Council on the state and security of critical infrastructure, and its resilience to force majeure and long-term trends; and
- developing plans and standards for both protection against counter terrorism/hazardous materials and natural hazards, and the upgrading of critical infrastructure.

The Emergency Preparedness Unit will have responsibility for:

- drawing up national response frameworks to address the priorities identified in the National Risk Assessment;
- ensuring that each Department, agency and emergency responder develops appropriate plans in line with priorities;
- exercising those plans to ensure their compatibility and complementarity and the readiness and competence of the staff;
- setting national standards for interoperability;
- developing national response capabilities through training, and through monitoring the development of local response capabilities; and
- building human capability through the Emergency Planning College.

The Cyber Security and Information Assurance Unit will have responsibility for:

- setting cyber security policy and standards for all Government Departments, suppliers to government and critical infrastructure operators, and developing a programme for verification and validation to ensure these standards are met;
- providing advice to government, suppliers, critical infrastructure operators and also businesses on computer security, network security, information security and information assurance;
- developing a cross-government framework for testing system vulnerabilities and for training that all departments can utilise;
- developing a cyber security exercise programme, similar to the national counter terrorism exercise programme that exists; and
- developing a capability that can be deployed to support the response to cyber disasters.

The National Resilience Team will have feeding into it a 'Cyber Threat and Assessment Centre'.

As the greater part of critical infrastructure is in private hands, there will need to be a National Infrastructure Advisory Council which brings together all private sector operators alongside the National Resilience Team. This is increasingly important given that despite the interconnectedness of the various sectors and the increasing risk of cascading failure, operators are not talking to each other.

5. Footnotes

1. Office for National Statistics, *Foreign Direct Investment 2007*, 11 December 2008.
2. Office for National Statistics, *Foreign Direct Investment 2007*, 11 December 2008.
3. Sakia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
4. See the UK Climate Change Projections 2009, available at <http://ukcp09.defra.gov.uk/>.
5. See Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko, 'Enhancing U.S. Preventative Action', *Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 48*, October 2009.
6. *Learning lessons from the 2007 floods: An independent review by Sir Michael Pitt* (London: Cabinet Office, June 2008), para. 11.67 – 11.76.
7. Conservative Party, *The Low Carbon Economy*, Policy Green Paper No. 8, January 2009.
8. David Cameron, speech to National Farmers Union Centenary Conference, 18 February 2008; Pauline Neville-Jones, 'Resource Rivalry and the Global Economy: A Conservative Approach to Securing our Energy Supplies', ippr National Security Commission Speech, 5 February 2009; Pauline Neville-Jones, 'Security Implications of the Global Economic Crisis', speech to the 5th World Islamic Economic Forum, Jakarta, 2 March 2009.
9. Tony Blair, Speech on Official launch of Langeled gas pipeline, 16 October 2006, available at <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page10235.asp>.
10. 'Britain's energy crisis: How long till the lights go out?', *Economist*, 6 August 2009 and 'The looming electricity crunch: Dark days ahead', *Economist*, 6 August 2009. This is confirmed in HM Government, *The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan: Analytical Index*, 15 July 2009, p. 85.
11. This is part of a broader move from the 'need to know' to a 'need to share' principle guiding the distribution of information and intelligence in government. Put simply, information must be shared with those organisations on the frontline of tackling radicalisation by developing partnerships with them.
12. HM Government, *The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan: Analytical Index*, 15 July 2009, p. 85.