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might be made. Our conclusions are set out briefly in the Annex. They can be summarised as follows.

a. In this timescale UK deterrent planning need not be geared to any nuclear threat beyond that posed by the Soviet Union.

b. We should base our policies on the assumption that much the same adversary relationship will continue with the Soviet Union as we have today.

c. The interdependence between the United States and Western Europe is such that the close institutional links, including that in the North Atlantic Alliance, are very unlikely to be broken; but it cannot be safely assumed that the threat by the United States to use its nuclear weapons in defence of European interests will be credible to the Soviet Union in all circumstances.

d. We see the principal risk to continued transatlantic co-operation arising from possible developments within Western European states and within the European Community as an institution. If such developments appeared to threaten European and transatlantic solidarity, they could lead to strong pressures for new departures in West German policy, including the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability.

III. THE POLITICO-MILITARY REQUIREMENT

17. As we deploy other nuclear capabilities under our own control, a decision not to proceed with a further strategic force would not necessarily mean that we ceased to be a NWS. But in practice we judge it likely that we should be led progressively to abandon our nuclear weapon programmes, and to deploy any theatre nuclear capabilities with American warheads provided under "dual key" arrangements. This is because a UK theatre nuclear capability would be of reduced credibility if it was not underpinned by a strategic nuclear force (see paragraph 23 below); it is doubtful whether there would be a viable programme of work for our nuclear weapons research and manufacturing facilities without a strategic

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