

EXERCISE SHORT SERMON 2006

ALL AGENCY REPORT



Ministry of Defence



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PREFACE

Introduction

1. Exercise Short Sermon 2006 was a Grade A¹ Nuclear Accident Response Exercise, to test the local and national level response to an accident involving the reactor of a Nuclear Powered Warship (NPW) in HM Naval Base Clyde. The exercise was conducted in accordance with the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 on 22 November 2006. Argyle and Bute council hosted a remediation workshop on 23 November 2006.

Aim

2. The primary aim of the exercise was to test the Operator's On-site emergency plan (Clyde Nuclear Safety Orders), the Local Authority Off-site response plan together with the MOD's Lead Government Department role and its interface with the Scottish Executive.

Principles of Response

3. Co-ordination was implemented from three local response sites. In ascending order these are: Operational (BRONZE), Tactical (SILVER) and Local Strategic (GOLD). For defence nuclear accidents the MoD is designated as the Lead Government Department (LGD) and at the national strategic level this is discharged through the Headquarters Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (HQ NARO) in MoD Main Building, Whitehall, London. The Scottish Executive, which has responsibility for the consequences management aspects of a defence nuclear accident in Scotland, discharges this role through the Scottish Executive Emergency Rooms (SEER) in Edinburgh.

Scenario

4. The scenario involved a fictitious Swiftsure Class nuclear powered Attack Submarine (SSN) that was berthed in HMNB Clyde. A series of highly unlikely system and procedural failures, culminated in a fictitious nuclear reactor accident with a release of radioactive material to atmosphere. This accident simulated a number of conventional, irradiated and contaminated casualties, some requiring hospital treatment. The accident scenario involved a simulated release of radioactive material that had an impact on the local community.

Constraints

¹ Grade A Exercise – A demonstration of all phases of the response in which live play and the participation of MoD and all relevant external agencies is maximised at the national and local strategic, tactical and operational levels.

5. In order to achieve key exercise objectives including the handover of the chairmanship of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group from Strathclyde Police to Argyll and Bute Council, significant time compression of events was employed. This imposed a number of constraints upon the players and necessitated pre-positioning of responding forces. A remediation day was held at the Clyde Off Site Centre (COSC) on 23 November to consider the long term recovery aspects of the accident.

Participation

6. Approximately 800 personnel from MoD, civil authorities and emergency services participated in the exercise, including:

- UK Ministry of Defence
- Argyle and Bute Council
- Strathclyde Police
- NHS Highland
- Department for Transport
- Metrological Office
- Scottish Environment Protection Agency
- Government decontamination Service
- Foods Standards Agency Scotland

Follow-Up Action

7. Lessons identified from this exercise will be taken forward in a number of ways. Each participating agency should address any lessons identified through their own procedures. Lessons with national implications should be reported to national representative bodies for further action.

Acknowledgement

8. The MoD gratefully acknowledges the significant contribution of all the agencies involved in planning for and exercising of the plans for responding to an accident involving the reactor of a nuclear submarine at HM Naval Base Clyde, Faslane.

United Kingdom Ministry Of Defence

Aims

9. The aims of Exercise Short Sermon 2006 for the MoD Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO) were:
- a. To test the Operator's Emergency Plan for a nuclear powered submarine reactor accident at HMNB Clyde.
 - b. To test the MoD input into the Argyll and Bute Council's Off-site public safety plan.
 - c. To test the efficiency of the MoD Lead Government Department arrangements and its interface with other Government Departments and the Scottish Executive.

Participation

- 10 The following MoD organisation participated:
- a. Headquarters Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (HQ NARO) – HQ NARO was manned in MoD Main Building and comprised of 4 cells: an Operations Cell, Secretariat Cell, Safety Cell and a Health Cell. Other Government Departments and Agencies attended HQ NARO and were represented on the Nuclear Accident Information and Advisory Group (NAIAG).
 - b. HM Naval Base CLYDE – The full Clyde Naval Base NARO, led by the Director Naval Base Clyde (DNBC) participated in the exercise. In addition to the Naval Base personnel support was provided by the Army: HQ land Forces, 33 Regiment Royal Engineers and from DSTL the Defence Radiological Protection Service (DRPS). HM Naval base Devonport and Institute of Naval Medicine (INM) provided Emergency Monitoring support.
 - c. Wider MoD and Defence Contractors - Technical Support was provided by Abby Wood assisted by Roll Royce marine Power at derby and Serco Assurance (safety and Reliability Directorate) of AEA technology in Warrington. The Director Naval Base Clyde (DNBC) Military Co-ordinating Authority (MCA) and he led the HM Naval Base Clyde response.

Good Points

11. The aim of the Exercise was successfully achieved. Both the Operator's plan and the local authority Off-site plans were adequately tested.
12. The MoD's Nuclear Accident Response Information Management System (NARIMS) performed well throughout the Exercise. The availability

and reliability of the system was demonstrated and provided access to consistent and dependable information consummate with the expectations of the users.

13. The exercise planning, management and control was sound. This provided a realistic but challenging exercise that allowed responders to fully demonstrate their capabilities.

Lessons Learnt

14. Exercise play at the National Strategic level has highlighted a need for a review of the "Concept of Operations" which details the co-ordination and interaction between MOD HQ NARO and COBR.

15. Call out and alerting of external MoD and OGD was not exercise due to pre-positioning of personnel to aid the time compression of the exercise. This functionality of the response should be considered for future exercise.

16. A need to review the interaction of the COSC media team and the MoD HQ/DNews to provide meaningful engagement on public information and public relations issues.

17. The exercise has identified the need for the NAHQ role to have a clear focus on the safety of personnel on-site and on accident mitigation, thus a review of its roles should be undertaken and additional training provided if required.

18. The need to review and clarify the implementation arrangements within the Exclusion Zone reception Centre (EZRC) and subsequent processing and assessment of personnel from the exclusion zone.

Department for Transport (DfT)

Aims

19. The aims of the DfT in participating in this exercise were:
- a. To test its arrangements for responding to a defence nuclear accident.
 - b. To familiarise DfT staff with the facilities of the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC).

Participation

20. Nuclear Specialists from the Dangerous Goods Division attended the DCMC on the first day of the exercise and the recovery discussions in Scotland on the second day of the exercise.

Good points

21. The member of staff attending on the first day of the exercise gained familiarity with the facilities in the DCMC and was able to give the required advice on restrictions to air and marine transport local to the incident.

22. The member of staff who attended the recovery day was able to give appropriate advice on the transport of radioactively contaminated material in the area surrounding the incident site.

Lessons Learnt

23. Maps obtained from the internet did not contain the required depth of detail, e.g. the definition is such that spot heights and contour lines cannot be seen clearly.

24. In a real incident the DfT response is likely to be led by staff from a Division other than Dangerous Goods Division. It proved difficult to engage these other Divisions in this exercise.

Argyll and Bute Council

Aims

25. The aims of Argyll and Bute council during the Exercise were:
- a. To test the HM Naval Base Clyde, Off-site Contingency Plan.
 - b. Improve cell operations.
 - c. Improve communications between groups, and between these groups and the Argyll & Bute Council cell.
 - d. Improve Recovery Working Group procedures.
 - e. Test new message handling system.
 - f. Test response from new Argyll Community Housing Association (ACHA).
 - g. Exercise live Rest Centre at Victoria Halls in conjunction With exercise.
 - h. Test Council guidance on issue of PITs to schoolchildren.

Participation

26. The following personnel participate in the Exercise:

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Played</u>
Douglas Hendry, Strategic Director	(played the Chief Executive)- Local Strategic Co-ordination Group
Andy Law, Strategic Director	Local Tactical Co-ordination Group
Sandy Taylor, Chief Protective Services Officer	Chair, Recovery Working Group
Lynda Syed, Communications Manager	Media Cell
Carol Keeley, Emergency Planning Officer	Directed for Council
Susan Donnelly, Assistant Emergency Planning Officer	Managed Council Cell

Lynn Smillie, Area Corporate
Services Manager

Support to Andy Law

Fiona Ferguson, PA to Director

Support to Douglas Hendry

Good Points

27. The planning process was much improved, with the following:
 - a. Professional media training for Argyll and Bute council staff.
 - b. Regular internal update meetings with key players.
 - c. Helpline training.
 - d. Multi-agency training day.
 - e. Improvements to storyboard
28. During the exercise the following observations were made:
 - a. Cell operations were much improved.
 - b. Communications between media group and with the Council cell was also improved.
 - c. Both Directors worked well in their respective positions considering this was their first time in these positions.
 - d. The Local Emergency Response Teams always work well together they are very experienced in emergency response.
 - e. Reporting from Strategic and Tactical Groups back to the Council cell was far more effective than in the last exercise.

Lessons Learned

29. Issues highlighted during the Recovery Day will be addressed through some tabletop exercises later this year before the next Short Sermon. This was agreed by all agencies at the multi-agency debrief meeting.
30. The message handling system will be revisited; with some agencies being instructed in the correct use of the paperwork system.
31. It is recommended that at the next exercise that the Recovery day be held separate from the Emergency phase of the exercise.

NHS Highland

Aims

32. The aims of the NHS Highland were:
- a. To test the NHS Highland procedures for Public Health and emergency medical service response to an incident at HM Clyde Naval Base.
 - b. To test new integration and co-ordination procedures between NHS Highland and NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde.
 - c. To give key personnel practice in expected roles and responsibilities in emergency procedures during a major incident.
 - c. To establish satisfactory communication links between NHS Highland at Clyde Off-Site Centre (COSC) and NHS Highland (Assynt House).
 - d. To test communications between all responding agencies.

Participation

33. The following personnel participate in the Exercise:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Designation</u>
Yvonne McGrinder	Emergency Planning Officer
Gill Keel	Head of Communications
Erin Greig	Communications Manager
David Ritchie	Communications Manager
James Brass	IT Manager
Basil Moran NHS GG&C	IT Manager
Ken Oates (Tactical)	Consultant in Public Health Medicine
Dennis Tracey (Tactical)	Consultant in Public Health Medicine
Oliver Blatchford NHS GG&C (Health Advisory Group)	Consultant in Public Health Medicine
Eric Baijal Strategic (Gold)	Director of Public Health & Health Policy
Linda DeCaestaker NHS GG&C Strategic (Gold)	Director of Public Health
Helen MacDonald (Health Advisory Group)	Health Protection Nurse Specialist
Elaine Garman	Public Health Specialist
Andrew Falconer	General Practitioner
Mavis Gilfillan	Community Nurse
Heather Spriggs	Community Nurse

Anne Helstrip	Locality Manager
David Ross	Public Involvement Manager
Christine Gosman	Administration
Gwendoline Devine	Administration
Eleanor Jane Thomson	District Nurse
Alan Dorn NHS GG&C (Health Advisory Group)	Emergency Planning Officer
Syed Ahmed NHS GG&C (Health Advisory Group)	Consultant in Public Health Medicine
Catherine Chiang NHS GG&C (Health Advisory Group)	Consultant in Public Health Medicine

Good Points

34. The following points were observed during the exercise:
- Good inter-agency communication both at planning stage and throughout the exercise.
 - Development of NHS Highland staff understanding of each agencies role during the response to an incident, both during the exercise planning stage and during the live exercise.
 - Integration and co-ordination procedures between NHS Highland and NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde have been identified and mutual aid arrangements developed.

Lessons Learnt

35. Lessons learnt were:
- Existing NHS response arrangements have been further developed i.e. clarity of individual roles, command and control protocols.
 - Existing IT equipment in the NHS Cell within the COSC requires enhancement .
 - Existing emergency response documents require to be updated to reflect the integration of both health boards.

Met Office

Aims

36. The aims of the Met Office were:
- a. To test the running of the NAME² model and its inclusion onto RIMNET³.
 - b. To test the effectiveness of the Met Office input into the MoD's NAIAG at Whitehall.
 - c. To test the effectiveness of the Met Office input at the local Gold at HM Naval Base Clyde.
 - d. To exercise communications with other outside organisations.

Participation

37. The Environment Monitoring and Response Centre (EMARC) forecaster participated at the Met Office HQ in Exeter providing advice remotely to both local and national centres. Additionally a Public Weather Service advisor participated at a local level at HM Naval Base Clyde, while two Public Weather Service Advisors participated in the national response at the NAIAG. They provided appropriate interpretation of the forecast data to the incident commanders at both locations.

Good Points

38. The NAME model output was successfully made available to the RIMNET system.
39. There was good communication between the EMARC at Exeter and the PWS advisors at the two exercise locations. There was also good communication between the advisors and the other agencies, including the RIMNET team, at the NAIAG.

Lessons Learnt

² The Nuclear Accident Model (NAME) is an essential component of the contingency plans in the event of an accident involving the release of radioactivity into the earth's atmosphere. It provide early warning for the guidance of emergency services and predicts concentrations, depositions and dosages of radionuclides (an isotope of an element which is unstable and undergoes natural radioactive decay) as input to risk-assessment models (e.g. for foodstuffs).

³ RIMNET, the Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network, is the UK radiation monitoring and nuclear emergency response system, set up as part of the National Response Plan following the Chernobyl accident.

40. A more realistic weather scenario covering "the next few days" would have been beneficial in supporting the provision of advice over a longer timescale.

41. There were initial problems with access to the internet and email at the NAIAG. It would have been useful to have a phone point into which a Met Office laptop could have been plugged.

42. The advisor at HM Naval Base Clyde felt there would be benefit from the Met Office and RIMNET representatives being in closer physical proximity. This was not an issue at the NAIAG.

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) – Health Protection Agency (HPA) Clyde NAHQ

Aims

43. The aims of DSTL – HPA were to demonstrate HPA shift changes and provide Radiation Protection Advice (RPA) support to the Incident Commander (IC).

Participation

44. Mr Graham Hughes attended Nuclear Accident HQ (NAHQ) as HP Adviser to IC.

Good Points

45. The following points were observed:

- a. Shift handover with site HPA went reasonably well with a good verbal situation report being provided by the HMNB Clyde HPA to the IC.
- b. Multiple entries by intervention teams facilitated by having addition HP resources present (HPA to TASG).
- c. Up to date dose information via NARIMS was readily accessible

Lessons Learnt

46. Lessons learnt were:

- a. Exercise Directing Staff injections were unrealistic at times despite acceptance of exercise artificiality e.g. Dose assessments for crew members who made an unauthorised evacuation from HMS Voracity.
- b. Maps in NAHQ were inadequate – no scaling and too few.
- c. EZRC had no direct access to a NARIMs terminal.
- d. Communications for re-entry teams were inadequate – no dose information etc was relayed back to EZRC.

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) – Health Protection (HP) in Support of Clyde Off-Site Centre

Aims

47. To provide Health Physics input, in support of HM Naval Base Clyde, at the off-site centre. To liaise with other agencies (e.g. HPA, DEFRA, Local Authority) and the Military Co-ordinating Authority to ensure that the off-site response is co-ordinated on the basis of sound Health Physics principles and that external agencies have access to Health Physics and accident response data sufficient to allow them to discharge their duties.

Participation

48. Health Physics Adviser at Clyde Off-Site Centre (COSC). PM Shift - Taking over from Clyde Health Physics representative.

Good Points

49. The response went reasonably smoothly. The PM HP shift was facilitated by a thorough hand-over from the AM HP shift and the links between the Health Physics Cell and outside agencies/ MCA/ monitoring controller etc. seemed to be well established by hand-over. The response and work of the COSC was also well co-ordinated and facilitated by the MCA, who discharged her duty effectively and encouraged and supported effective communication within the COSC.

Lessons Learnt

50. Communication is the key to effective management and execution of COSC function. Strong management and a good handover facilitated own function.

Strathclyde Police

Aims

51. To raise awareness of key personnel of their expected roles and responsibilities with a view to enhancing the capability of Strathclyde Police to respond to a major incident. To include the following objectives:

- a. Exercise initial notification procedures.
- b. Exercise initial response and resourcing of COSC.
- c. Test internal and external communications.
- d. Exercise co-ordination of emergency response.

Participation

52. The following personnel attended the exercise:

Strategic Commander	ACC Learmonth supported by Staff Officer, Logger, Minute Takers
Tactical Commander	Chief Superintendent Roger supported by Deputy Tactical Commander, Staff Officer, Logger, Office Manager, Message Co-ordinator, Storm monitor, Admin Officer, 2 Telephonists, Minute Takers, Liaison Officer, Recovery Group Officer.
Media	Head of Corporate Communications, Media and PR Manager.
Force Overview	Duty Officer, Force Overview, supported by Area Controller
Emergencies Planning Section	Emergency Procedures Advisor to Strategic and Tactical Commanders and Liaison Officer at Whitehall.

Good Points

53. Multi-agency co-operation worked well. Strategic Commander was able to concentrate on strategic issues and chaired the meetings in the appropriate fashion.

54. The initial notification procedure worked well from a police perspective.

55. The Tactical Commander was supported by a Deputy which proved advantageous particularly when the Tactical Commander was attending strategic meetings.

56. The appointment of a Police Liaison Officer at Whitehall proved invaluable in highlighting the need for both local knowledge and information sharing. Difficulties did arise in terms of the information flow. This will be covered below.

57. In terms of exercise planning the process ran reasonably smoothly. The main difficulty was receiving the specific injects from the various agencies on time.

Lessons Learnt

58. The main lessons learnt for Strathclyde Police was the identification of the roles required to deal with such an incident effectively.

59. The police were comfortable with the message handling system, however, this was not common to all agencies.

60. In terms of minute taking equipment and facilities the police are currently reviewing their needs and structure. The equipment needs will be dealt with by the police, however, the provision of additional office space, not necessarily on the same floor, would be advantageous.

61. The Liaison Officer who attended Whitehall felt he was unsighted at times in terms of decisions made and incident updates. The provision of minutes of strategic meetings was helpful but these were not readily available. This situation was remedied by use of the NARIMS system and should be utilised from the outset for future events.

62. Media; from a police perspective it is agreed that putting the two naval officers in front of the camera initially was not a good idea. In the future the police media representative would recommend that a senior police officer should be the first to confront the media.

Scottish Environment Protection Agency

Aims

63. To test alerting procedures and to raise awareness amongst key personnel as to their expected roles and responsibilities in the setting of a nuclear emergency
64. To develop an awareness of the multi agency response to such an incident and the principles of Integrated Emergency Management and Command and Control

Participation

65. Within Clyde Off Site Centre at Strategic and Tactical command levels

Good Points

66. The catering provision was excellent for the main meals. The chance to leave the building was welcomed. In a real event I would hope that more around the clock provision could be made, so that you could take a meal when the action permits it, rather than at specific meal times.

Lessons Learnt

67. The office arrangements were far from adequate with only one desk nominated for the entire staff attending. Hence not all could be seated at once. Only one telephone point was available plus mobiles, it is worth noting that these did actually work. In a real incident it would certainly need 3 people to deal with the meetings and information flow to/from support offices.
68. The health cell had 12 people in it (4 HPA, 4 FSA, 3 SEPA and 1 DEFRA) and this was simply too crowded. The ventilation system was totally inadequate to deal with this making it hot and stuffy. In a real event with no doubt more heat and nerves it would be difficult to think straight.
69. The meeting areas were poor acoustically and the general background noise from around the building made it difficult to hear what was being said by all participants, and when you miss a "not" or similar you can get completely the wrong message.
70. On a positive note I felt that in the emergency phase the Health Advisory Group (HAG) worked well, was well chaired and focussed on the job required. All seemed to contribute and were keen to work together to get a solution. The only slight adverse comment here was an independent consultant who seemed keen to rewrite some of the basic rules (like who should receive PITs and the potential dangers of giving these to the elderly). While his contribution was valuable, he seemed to take too much prominence in the decision making.

71. The recovery day was a great disappointment. The 5 day elapsed time proved to be part of its downfall, since nearly all that was done on the day would have been done normally during the previous 5 days. It therefore had so much artificiality as to make it far less valuable as an exercise. A better approach might have been to try and run the five days in an accelerated manner on the day.

72. The organisation on the recovery phase becomes very blurred, and failed to distinguish between the role of the recovery WG and the tactical group, in the way that it was implemented and actions taken. There seemed to be scope for actions being initiated from several sources, and not always with the same objective.

73. Communications arrangements were confusing and the functionality of message forms time consuming. In an emergency time must not be wasted delivering messages.

74. The MOD placed a lot on monitoring information on NARIMS. This was not apparently transferred to RIMNET and so was not available to support staff in Perth and at the HPA offices in Glasgow.

75. There was little dissemination of minutes of the strategic group or any of the 15 plus press releases. Sometimes something did appear in the cell in tray, but this seemed sporadic and random.

76. The site broadcast is a good way of communicating, and should be used to make major announcements e.g. category 2 to 3 transition.

77. The meetings at the various levels were not held according to a set timetable, and would be representative of a real event which would have to meet as and when necessary, but there needed to be better co-ordination of the various groups so that information flow could be properly organised, and people were not expected to be in two places at once.

78. It was good to have the cells labelled so you knew who was where although Scottish water did not have a specific home that could be identified.

Government Decontamination Service (GDS)

Aims

79. Familiarising GDS staff with the structures, processes and protocols involved in the response to a major Radiation incident (crisis response and recovery phases): and to provide an opportunity for existing/new members of GDS to test current skills/knowledge.
80. Enhance the standing of GDS at multi agency exercises by providing coherent, consistent and timely advice, facilitation and guidance at all stages and levels of the exercise.
81. To provide an opportunity for the GDS science team to operate at the GDS Emergency Operations Centre, to examine their relationship with Environmental Agency, Food Standards Agency, Health Protection Agency, etc and to assess future requirements.
82. To identify the decontamination implications of a radiation leak (to inform future activity).
83. Identify, as far as possible, who GDS needs to build relationships with to support effective recovery from this type of incident.
84. Consider the relationship between GDS and the police, investigation and forensic recovery, other investigative bodies (such as the HSE) and how/where is it managed.
85. Develop a greater understanding of the operational impacts /management issues around the deployment of specialist suppliers.
86. Make a record of the exercise and consequent developments in order to provide the basis of a case study for GDS specialist suppliers (Outcomes will be used to inform future exercises).

Participation

87. The following personnel took part in the exercise:
 - a. Phil Causer
 - b. Mick Cross
 - c. GDS Liaison Team 1 (part of Recovery Working Group)

Good Points

88. The following points were observed:
 - a. Pre-exercise planning meetings were excellent.
 - b. Call out procedure worked well

- c. Exercise interagency relationships were good
- d. GDS communication and response from supplier was successfully tested
- e. Off-site facility was good

Lessons Learnt

89. Whilst an attempt was made to provide a realistic scenario to focus on the recovery stage of an incident, the timescales involved made this impracticable. More work required by all agencies to develop a realistic training event to test all aspects beyond the response phase of an incident.

Strathclyde Fire and Rescue

Aims

90. To raise awareness amongst key personnel of their expected roles and responsibilities with a view to enhancing the capability of Strathclyde Fire & Rescue to respond to a major incident. To include the following objectives:

- a. To Audit notification procedures of an incident to H.M. Naval Base Clyde.
- b. To exercise liaison between Strathclyde Fire & Rescue (SFR), The Royal Navy, Strathclyde Police and other participating agencies.
- c. To exercise co-ordination of the Off-site response to an incident within HMNB Clyde.
- d. To exercise SFR media response to incidents of this nature.
- e. To exercise SFR Command & Control Centre in working with Clyde Off Site Centre during a major incident.
- f. To test and prove SFR capabilities in decontamination procedures.

Participation

91. The following personnel attended the exercise:

1 X Assistant Chief Officer	Local Strategic (Gold Command)
2 X Area Managers	Local Strategic Command
4 X Group Managers	Local Tactical Command
2 X Group Managers	Local Operational Command
1 X Station Manager	Local Operational Command
1 X appliance plus crew	Operations at NAHQ within Naval Base
4 X appliances plus crews	Mass decontamination (SFR exercise only)

Good Points

92. An excellent exercise, which fully engaged and tested all participating Strathclyde Fire & Rescue Officers.

93. The exercise also demonstrated that the successful conclusion of an incident of this nature is dependant on the Incident Commander within the Clyde Off Site Centre maintaining an overview of the entire incident, productive deployment of supporting officers and effective communications with all participants.

94. A well planned event which produced good outcomes, due to the time and effort put in by the multi agency "Planning Team" in the preparation of this exercise.

Lessons Learnt

95. Highlighted the need to restructure the layout of SFR cell within the Clyde Off Site Centre.

96. Exercise injects which do not contribute fully to the overall aims of the exercise to be avoided. Mass Decontamination exercise proved to be valuable to SFR, as it provided a realistic training venue with large number of casualties. However this caused some confusion with the Naval Base. This was due to an unrealistic scenario, Local authority Fire & Rescue Service would not be required to decontaminate Naval personnel in the event of an actual incident.

Food Standards Agency Scotland (FSAS)

Aims

97. The aims of the FSA were:
- a. To test the response to notification of an off-site emergency;
 - b. To provide training opportunity for FSAS staff at off-site centre;
 - c. To simulate 'full' FSA response from strategic centre.

Participation

98. FSAS Exercise participation took place at the Clyde Off-Site Centre (COSC) and MBC. Given the level of FSA participation in Exercise Hudson earlier in the month and lack of resources, an incident team/technical team was not set up in FSAS or HQ.

99. However, an FSA response was simulated through players at the offsite centre. A Strategic Co-ordinating Centre (SCC) Leader attended the Strategic centre (COSC) on behalf of FSAS along with 2 HQ colleagues for support and technical expertise in addition to a communications expert who attended the Media Briefing Centre. If required, legal advice could be sought from the Office of the Solicitor of the Scottish Executive (OSSE).

100. The FSAS' players' role in this exercise was to take the strategic, policy and operational lead, whilst HQ players roles were to provide technical and policy advice.

Good Points

101. In the planning process, initial difficulties with staff changes and confusion over which office (FSA HQ or FSAS) invitations to planning meetings were to be sent to were quickly resolved by the Short Sermon team based at COSC, who were particularly helpful. The issue of reduced level of play for FSAS was understood well by the Exercise co-ordinators and other organisations, once they were assured there would be FSA participation and a full response simulated from the strategic centre.

102. During the exercise there was very good communication between other agencies/organisations and good teamwork over all.

103. From an Agency point of view, it was felt that the reduced level of play ultimately did not have any negative impact on the FSA response. Decisions were made by the SCC Leader on the back of technical advice from HQ colleagues and we were encouraged by the success of this approach, and it may be possible to use this approach again in future, when resources are limited.

Lessons Learnt

104. As we did not receive any notification, a call was made to the off site centre to alert them of this at approximately 10 am. The COSC however, are aware of the problems with notification procedures and are reviewing the system.

105. The working groups were run in rather tight timescales and tended to run into each other making it difficult to attend different groups which would have sometimes been appropriate and beneficial.

106. The facilities provided and lack of phone points, printer and internet raised some concern but highlighted to FSAS the need to provide a mobile kit with printer etc for remote players to take away with them. This will be considered for future exercises.

107. The recovery phase (five days on) did not work as well as it could of due to a lack of data, therefore there was no sampling data available to refine FEPA.

