

COMMUNITY ADVISERS TRAINING

HUNSONBY

GROUP 'A'

Venue: Community Centre
Hunsonby

Meetings: 6 December 1979
3 January 1980
7 February 1980
6 March 1980
2 October 1980
6 November 1980

LIST OF VOLUNTEERS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>OCCUPATION</u>
Kenneth A. Gillan	Deputy Area Engineer, N.W.W.A.
Stewart E. Males	Teacher
Des Youngman	Telecom. Technical Officer (MOD)
Mr. D. W. Burne	Farmer
Mr. S. J. Holliday	Farmer
Mr. N. J. B. Jones	Miller
Mr. J. A. Henderson	Retired Bank Manager
Major R. O. G. Wood	Retired Army Officer
George R. Morton	Farmer
Joseph E. Mason	Farmer
Mrs. Jacky Breach	Housewife
Mr. J. M. Lishman	Chartered Surveyor
Robert Ian Stout	Sales Representative
Harold B. Nicholson	Self-employed Painter/Decorator
Harold A. Stiles	Retired Executive Engineer (Post Office)
Mr. R. Allan	Poultry Keeper
W. E. Hall	Painter and Decorator
S. Craig	Joiner
Hugh Jago	Farm Worker

Course Tutor: Sqd. Ldr. G. H. Dorricott

SYLLABUS

1. Background to War Emergency Planning
2. Characteristics and Effects of Nuclear Weapons
3. Preparatory Measures for Protection and Survival of Small Communities
4. Problems of Survival and Recovery in the Post Strike Phase
5. Communication and Communications
6. Food and Water
7. Health and Hygiene
8. Law and Order
9. Organisation and Control of manpower and materials
10. Responsibilities of the Community Adviser

BACKGROUND TO EMERGENCY PLANNING

THE MAIN THREAT TO PEACE

In his Imperial College Jubilee lecture, General Sir John Hackett quotes from Thurber who said that "Progress was all right; it only went on too long"; and he deduces from this that man has developed the means of destruction but seems incapable of controlling it - or at best lacks the will to try to do so. Whether or not one agrees with this, it is a fact that, since the dawn of civilisation, mankind has never really been free from the fear of war of one kind or another; and perhaps this has never been more true than the continuous threats to peace we have all faced since the end of the last great war to end all wars.

History has recorded the creation of the immense power vacuum to the East and West of the Soviet Union by the defeat of both Germany and Japan in the mid 1940's. The Soviets were quick to take advantage of this by maintaining their mighty war machines and establishing forward defence bases in Eastern Europe. By contrast, the West commenced rapid demobilisation as soon as hostilities were over, and attempted to expedite the economic recovery of Europe with considerable assistance from America. Russia refused economic aid, forced Czechoslovakia and Poland to do the same, and initiated agitation and strikes through Communist infiltration into many Governments and Trade Unions in Europe.

Western Counteraction

These apparent acts of hostility compelled the Western democracies to seek a means of re-establishing the balance of forces. This resulted in the hastily conceived Brussels Treaty in 1948 and the more meaningful North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1949. The United Kingdom is a signatory to both treaties, and a major contributor to the forces maintained by NATO both as a deterrent and a defence against the steadily increasing military strength of the Soviet Union and her allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. There can be little doubt that, with all its faults, NATO has enabled us to enjoy thirty four years of so called peaceful co-existence - uneasy though this has been on many occasions. However, the rapid growth of Soviet nuclear power forced NATO to move from the initial trip wire strategy of massive nuclear retaliation to one of flexible response which was adopted in 1967 as a matter of expediency. The new strategy envisaged a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression and threats of aggression; and emphasised the need for consultation and joint action in meeting the twin concepts of deterrence and defence. But there have been glaring examples of the Alliance's failure to meet the conceptual requirements of the strategy. Member nations agreed to act jointly only when it suits their own self interests, and unilateral force reductions, which have gained momentum in most countries since 1968, erode our capability to respond effectively to conventional attack; and, by the same token, limit our flexibility of response. In effect, the current NATO strategy is becoming more and more a political expedient and the nuclear threshold dangerously low.

The Threat to Survival

Nevertheless, it would be folly to believe that the men and women who rule the destiny of the major powers in the world today lack either ability or intelligence, and they are certainly not mad. It is unrealistic, therefore, to even suggest that any one of the major nuclear powers would deliberately initiate a nuclear war; but it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that, for a variety of reasons, a minor incident might escalate rapidly out of control and result in a nuclear exchange. This error of judgement, miscalculation, act of desperation - call it what you will - is the greatest single threat to mankind. We live now in an unstable world where, as a former Secretary General of NATO once said, "it is the paradox of our times that the very progress achieved by man in the technological and social fields originally intended to improve his way of living now poses challenges to present and future generations."

During the last quarter of a century, there have been wars and rumours of wars; ranging from the protracted and disastrous wars in Vietnam and Cambodia, through the pathetic and bloody battles in India and Pakistan, the dramatic Arab Israeli conflicts, and the acrimonious disputes between allies and friends - Greek and Turk, and even Western Europe and America.

Still more recently, the 1962 Cuban crisis was re-enacted for us only a few months ago by the same players, in different roles, but with the same potentially dramatic ending. Even now, the outcome of the Iranian problem begs the eternal question - Will this be the spark to set our world on fire.

With luck, many more chapters of these historical dilemmas will be written in our time. Crises will come and, hopefully go; but as Alistair Buchan said "Like illness, an international crisis generally contains an element of the unexpected; like illness, research, consultation and action on the means of cure must be undertaken long before the turning point is reached." We have not yet reached that turning point; and at least in Cumbria we are intent on research, consultation and action in the sole interest of survival.

In any major war, involving NATO, this country assumes the role of the major staging post for reinforcements from North America en route to Europe. As such, our main airfields, ports, lines of communication etc., automatically become strategic targets for enemy attack. Clearly, therefore, "we must implement effective programmes to protect our civilian populations, industries and agriculture. We must undertake to instruct civilians in the art of war survival. (i) In essence, if the politicians and soldiers cannot guarantee peace, they can at least under-write a war survival plan."

A Broad Concept for Survival

But in order to achieve this aim in an era of economic crises and conflicting priorities, the Government must first analyse the implications of new patterns of war. Such an analysis is currently being undertaken in a number of NATO

countries, notably Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany; and here are some of the salient points of those results which have been published so far. In effect, civil emergency planning and preparedness:

- a. Must be an inseparable part of the NATO strategy.
- b. Should become a normal precept in public life, and every citizen must share in the burden imposed, and
- c. Dictates the need for comprehensive training at all levels to ensure a flexible response to the changing circumstances of war.

It is argued that the NATO strategy is only completely credible if our military resources are complemented by civil preparedness. For example, there seems little merit in maintaining a balanced conventional and nuclear military front line capability, if we fail to take reasonably adequate measures for the survival of our people at home. This raises all sorts of arguments, including the desirability of a deep shelter policy and the massive cost of it; the danger of escalation through over-reaction in a crisis situation; and the need to overcome some lack of political will for a variety of reasons, depending on individual beliefs, and points of view.

Whatever the arguments may be, if one accepts the validity of the principle, then a compromise solution must be found - and this background paper will discuss our proposed national and county solutions in some detail. Meanwhile, there is an obvious need to adopt civil emergency preparedness as a maxim at every level of administration. Every member of our communities must recognise the importance of accepting his or her individual share of the burden imposed. This is neither as difficult nor as costly as it might seem at first sight. It merely means that everyone in the public service should be aware of the part he or she may be required to play in a civil emergency; and it implies maximum co-operation in community tasks in the event of any major disaster, including nuclear war.

You may have noted the contents of a letter which appeared in the Cumberland Evening News published on 26 June 1979 under the banner headline "LIFE AFTER A WAR WITH NO SURVIVORS". The writer expressed his concern over the official support for our proposals to initiate these courses aimed at studying the art of survival in a nuclear war; because, he argued, that the use of modern nuclear weapons will automatically mean that there will be no survivors.

It would be folly to pretend that a nuclear war will not result in great loss to life. It would be just as foolish to believe that there will be no survivors; and some of you will know that comprehensive studies have confirmed that even after a nuclear attack on the U.K., a significant proportion of the population will survive. But many of these "survivors" will only continue to survive in the months and years to come if they are taught the art of survival now. The need for this training is dictated to a large extent by the probable loss of many of our sophisticated aids to life, in a country where we expect the government - in one form or another - to do just about everything for us.

Central Government Policy

An official assessment of the threat indicates that nuclear war - as distinct from biological or chemical warfare - is the most probable form of attack which would be made against this country; although a period of conventional war, lasting perhaps two or three weeks prior to nuclear strike, cannot be ruled out. The scale and pattern of attack cannot be forecast with precision; but, in general terms, there are likely to be heavy casualties and extensive damage across the country as a whole.

As an indication of the possible scale of attack, a survival rate of between 40 and 60 per cent of the population could be expected in the worst hit areas, and up to 95 per cent in the least affected, providing that proper pre-strike precautions had been taken. In any event, it is most unlikely that any part of the country would get away scot free. Those areas not subjected to the direct effects of a nuclear weapon (blast and fire) would probably be affected later by radioactive fallout; and those areas which escaped both, would be affected in varying degrees by the widespread damage to installations, loss of essential services - including communications - raw materials and productive capacity. So what can we do about all this? What we must surely not do is to throw our hands in the air and talk about 'Life after the war with no Survivors'!

In fact, the aims of civil emergency planning in war are

- a. To mitigate as far as is practicable, the effects of any direct attack involving the use of nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional weapons.
- b. To provide alternative machinery of government at all levels.
- c. To increase the prospects of survival and enhance the chances of national recovery in the post attack period.

The Home Office is primarily responsible for civil emergency planning, and this includes the co-ordination of the activities of all other ministries with a wartime role. It has been assumed that there will be a period of rising tension before any war, during which the government plans to advise the public on steps they should take to increase their chances of survival. Such advice will include

- a. Instructions to stay at home; there is no evacuation policy.
- b. Measures which families can take to improve the protection of their homes against fallout.
- c. Arrangements which should be made for storing food, water etc.

The Government has recently acknowledged that the period of rising tension - the warning or preparation time as far as we are concerned - may be much shorter than previously envisaged. In view of this, they are now encouraging increased emphasis on

both central and local training; and we hope to see a radical change in the resources allocated to war emergency planning in the near future.

Central Government will continue to function from its normal location for as long as possible. However, in the event of a breakdown in central control and communications, a system of de-centralised government has been devised. This establishes various levels of control which can either function as an entity, or operate independently at each level, as circumstances allow.

This system is based on 10 Home Defence Regions in England and Wales; Scotland and Ireland are zoned. For your information, Cumbria is in No.10 Region together with Lancashire, Cheshire, Greater Manchester and Merseyside.

The national organisational control structure is shown at the Annex to this paper. However, it is unlikely that Regional Government will be established until well on into the post strike period, when its function will be to draw together the threads of government. Each Region will have its own Regional Commissioner (a Secretary of State) and a skeleton staff, who will be dispersed throughout the Region during the period of rising tension. For obvious reasons, the locations of the seat of Regional Government will not be decided until after the nuclear strike.

In most cases, the locations of sub Regional Headquarters have already been decided and their Commissioners and Staffs (Approximately 180 per headquarters) already nominated and earmarked. The Sub-Regional Commissioner takes up his appointment during the pre-strike phase, but his executive responsibilities do not begin until Central Government is suspended or communications with them are lost. Cumbria and Lancashire are in No.1 Sub Region of No.10 Region.

So much for the broad Home Office policy on Civil Emergency Planning for war; but what are they doing to ensure that this policy is implemented in counties. As you know, for many good reasons, the Civil Defence Corps was disbanded in 1968, and Home Defence planning was placed on a care and maintenance basis. It was ultimately decided in 1974 that, although Civil Defence as such was an anachronism, planning to meet the problems of surviving a nuclear war should be carried out by local authorities, albeit in low key. Accordingly, emergency planning teams were established at County level to assist in the preparation of plans which would facilitate the orderly transition of the County and Districts from a peacetime to a wartime posture. The co-ordination of plans to meet major peacetime disasters was given as a secondary task.

At present 75 per cent of the cost of all war emergency planning is borne by Central Government. In particular, the Home Office bears the cost of the communications which link the County War Headquarters with the Sub Region and all District headquarters within the County, as well as lines to the Police and United Kingdom Warning and Monitoring Organisation. The average annual expenditure on emergency planning in Cumbria is around £50,000. This is a pretty small price to pay for survi

and there is a school of thought that more time, more effort, and just a little more money is needed. Perhaps, more importantly, with your help, we can achieve a great deal without raising the ante too high.

War Emergency Planning in Cumbria

Before attempting to offer our recipe for war emergency planning in the County, there might be merit in highlighting the major problems likely to arise in any situation after an attack - be it nuclear, chemical or biological warfare. These are:

- a. Massive damage, producing casualties and disease - possibly of epidemic proportions - and major disruption of communications and other essential services.
- b. The conservation and distribution of food and fuel.
- c. Violence engendered by fear, hunger, pain and desperation.
- d. Radiation (or chemical or biological) hazards, and
- e. A major influx of refugees.

Some of you may be aware of the statutory responsibilities of local government, which require plans to be made to

- a. Mitigate the effects of an attack involving the use of nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional weapons, and to
- b. Increase our chances of survival and facilitate a speedy return to normality in the post strike phase.

We are also advised that we should assume a reasonable period of warning, during which appropriate precautionary measures can be taken to prepare for war. These transition to war measures - as they are called - are an essential part of our plans. Their implementation can be carefully regulated so that we can either speedily adopt an effective wartime posture, or just as quickly revert to a peacetime footing should the crisis pass. Indeed, such is their importance, that a Home Office working group has been studying the feasibility of issuing a standard list of war preparatory measures for use nationwide, but which can be readily adapted to the specific needs of any county.

Of course, if we are fortunate enough to receive adequate warning - thus enjoying an orderly transition from peace to war, this will undoubtedly help to minimise the effects of an attack. But if we are to increase our chances of surviving and recovering quickly, we must also plan to:

- a. Receive and disseminate information on the result of any attack.
- b. Accommodate the Homeless
- c. Feed the Hungry
- d. Prevent the spread of disease, and dispose of the dead
- e. Clear and repair damaged buildings and highways
- f. Provide and maintain public services essential to community life.

In order to implement these plans, we must have an organisation capable of controlling and co-ordinating the use of the resources available to us.

Such an organisation - for County and District - is dealt with in Part 1 of our County War Book. This introduces the national system of decentralised wartime government and outlines the County and District wartime control organisations shown at the Annex. It also indicates the anticipated sequence of local events and action leading up to the outbreak of war, and gives general guidance to senior staffs to prepare them for their duties connected with their wartime appointments.

The organisation for each of our six Districts is very much a mirror image of the County's, but they are tasked with translating the broad plan into action required to provide direct assistance to our communities. This action is described in detail in the Community Organisation Plan which is the first one in Part II of the War Book. We envisage a logical grouping of wards and parishes to facilitate arrangements within each District for such things as communications and information, food procurement and distribution, emergency feeding and housing, works services, health and hygiene etc. Each group of wards or parishes within a district will be controlled by a "desk" established for this purpose at district War Headquarters. We believe that such an organisation will enhance the chances of survival and progressive recovery at all community levels.

One of the most important plans in the War Book is that dealing with Training. This Plan has been prepared in considerable detail to ensure that optimum use is made of peacetime training courses, seminars etc. These courses are held at the Home Defence College in Yorkshire and similar establishments elsewhere in the County for all those holding war appointments. It also includes arrangements for a crash training programme for additional wartime staffs; and this particular programme will undoubtedly be one of the more important preparation for war measures.

In the context of training, you may wish to note the progress we have made, and plan to make, in the training of nominated members of local government staffs and suitable volunteers from the general public. In October 1978, we took the opportunity afforded by a national military exercise called

"Scrum Half" to involve all of our Chief and senior officers at County level in a three day war game in the Castle. We have planned a series of similar exercises for all districts, and these commenced on 16 October 1979 when we mounted a major exercise in Copeland. On a more ambitious scale, we intend exercising the County and two District War HQs for three full days in September 1980.

Additionally, with the co-operation of the District Chief Executives, we commenced briefings for elected members of Districts and Parishes in June 1979. These briefings are intended to be the precursors to the commencement of the more comprehensive training programmes for Community Advisers, aimed at helping our people now to understand the problems they may face one day, and, more importantly what they can do to help themselves.

In general terms, we plan to train about one in every hundred persons in the County to advise their fellow citizens on the best means of survival in a nuclear war environment. There's nothing magical in this figure of 1 in 100; indeed, this rule of thumb cannot be applied sensibly in our more isolated rural communities. But it does provide us with what we believe to be a realistic target. The programme in each District (except Eden) will be spread over 3 years because our activities will be confined to the winter months of October to March only. In effect, it will involve volunteers, such as yourselves, giving up about one or two evenings each month.

Now what kind of people do we want? We are looking for men and women, from all walks of life, whose only qualifications need be commonsense, a strong will be survive even in extremely adverse conditions, and a sincere desire to help their fellow men. There will be no upper and lower age limits. Our only criterion will be the need for our volunteer to possess the maturity and experience necessary to allow him or her to contribute usefully to the discussions of these serious problems. For example, a very young teenager of say 13 or 14 may not be the right person to provide advice to a community at large; but mature 16 or 17 year old sixth formers might well be very useful members of a class; because they represent the view of youth now, and will be the young men and women of tomorrow's world - a world in which our present way of life and accepted values may have been wiped out overnight. By the same token, our senior citizens of 70 and thereabouts, who still retain their full mental faculties and are mobile, have a wealth of experience to offer. They will recall, often with great clarity, the more basic and often better ways of doing things which are now done for us by machines; more importantly perhaps, they will be mines of community information which we can use to great advantage. But, contrary to what one freelance journalist implied, recruitment of a 70 year old as a Community Adviser does not mean that we expect a nuclear war in his or her remaining lifetime!

Turning now to the content of the course, you have seen copies of the syllabus which we will use for our studies. These are problems which were highlighted earlier as being those which any community will face in a nuclear war environment. We have been able to examine these problems at national, county and district levels, and to make plans to deal with them; but you will appreciate the difficulties we would face in attempting to plan an organisation or make even outline arrangements for

dealing with these problems at the level of the smaller communities, that is to say at parish or ward level and below. That is why we are convinced that our best course is the one we have now embarked upon, in which volunteers from each community discuss and examine each problem in the light of their detailed knowledge of their communities, so that optimum use can be made of local resources - manpower and equipment - under the guidance of the Community Advisers.

Finally, what happens after our volunteers complete their studies? Do they just sit back and wait for war? Ideally, our "qualified" Community Advisers should undertake advanced studies, but they will need some guidance and direction. The Emergency Planning Team will be fully committed - indeed from 1981 onwards they will be overcommitted in other districts - and can only be of limited assistance.

It may be that some thought will have to be given to employing an emergency planning officer at District level. This is not an attempt to create a precedent, as Epping Forest District Council has clearly demonstrated in a recent newspaper advertisement. However, perhaps the best and most suitable of the trained Advisers might be selected to form a District Training Team. The Emergency Planning staff can then assist by preparing a syllabus of annual continuation training for use by that team. Such a syllabus can cater for advanced or technical training which might involve seeking the assistance of the District Scientific Advisers or Environmental Health Officers and so on.

It is against this broad background outlining the need for war emergency planning that we welcome your contribution. It will not be an easy task for any of us because, fortunately, we are unable to call on experience in a post nuclear strike environment to guide us in our discussions. But given certain broad parameters evolved from much study and research in many countries, we can examine each of the major problems in turn, and perhaps arrive at some compromise solution which might serve our community needs should the worst happen.